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LATIN  AMERICA'S  INTRAREGIONAL  TRADE: 
EVOLUTION AND FUTURE  PROSPECTS 
ABSTRACT 
This  paper  analyzes  in detail  the evolution  of Latin  America's  international 
trade patterns,  focusing on intraregional  trade and on the formal  attempts 
made to create  free  trade  zones or custom  unions.  In  particular,  we assess 
the role  of intraregional  trade in the structural  adjustment  required  by the 
Latin American  debt  crisis.  The data  analyzed show that the success of the 
commercial  integration  process has been quite limited.  They also show  that 
there has been  no significant  change in  the DECO  countries'  share  in Latin 
American  imports or in  the volume  of intraregional  trade flows  since  the 
early l970a.  Furthermore,  the nature  of the adjustment  to the debt  crisis 
of the 1980s  indicate  that Latin American  markets  possess a rather  limited 
capacity  to absorb  a substantial  increase  in  regional  exports  in  the current 
context.  Thus,  we conclude that  the success of  the required  expansion  in 
Latin  American  exports will  depend  more  on  the region's  ability to design 
innovative  mechanisms  to  penetrate  the markets  of industrialized  countries 
than  on the deepening  of any regional  trade integration  process. 
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405 Hilgard  Avenue  405 Hilgard  Avenue 
Los Angeles,  CA  90024  Los Angeles,  CA  90024 I.  Introduction 
The attempts  to integrate  Latin American  trade  date back,  at  least,  to 
the days of the independence  wars.  Simon Solivar  dreamed  of a Spanish 
America  integrated  politically  and economically.  Although  no serious 
efforts have  been made to  politically  unify  the region,  throughout  the years 
many  attempts  have  been made at  generating  some sort of integrated  economic 
zone  within  which free trade would  prevail.  Historically  moat  of those 
atcempta have  been less than  successful.  Recently,  however,  some experts 
have argued  that renewed efforts  towards regional  trade  integration  should 
be undertaken  as a way to face the debt crisis. 
There  is little  doubt  that a permanent  solution  to Latin  America's 
current  crisis,  and the resumption  of  sustained  growth, will  require  a  major 
effort  to increase  exports  and to enhance the role of the external  sector. 
It is especially  important,  then, to  determine  where  thoae  exports will go 
and who will  Latin  America  import from  in  the future.  In  particular,  it is 
important  to evaluate what contribution  could an expansion  of intraregional 
trade make to this process. 
The purpose  of this paper  is to  analyze  the evolution  of Latin 
America's  international  trade patterns,  focusing on intraregional  trade  and 
on the formal  attempts  made to create  free trade zones  or custom  unions. 
The analysis  also deals with the role  of the Latin  America's  main trade 
partner 
--  the  United  States  -- and  discusses  the role of Japan  and the 
Asian  NICs  in  the future  evolution  of Latin  America's  trade flows.  The 
paper  also discusses  the possible  future evolution  of regional  trade. 
The paper  is organized  aa  follows:  Section  II provides  a general 
account  of  the evolution  of Latin  America's  commercial  policies.  The 
section  is divided  into  two parts.  The first provides  a broad  view  of the 2 
evolution  of  protectionism  in  the region; the second  psrt is s more detailed 
analysis  of the region's  attempts  to formally  integrate  its international 
trade.  Here the objectives  snd institutional  characteristics  of  the most 
important  multilateral  trade agreements  are reviewed  and their  achievements 
are evaluated.  Section  III deals with  the recent  evolution  of Latin 
America's  directions  of  trade;  the origin of aggregate  imports  and the 
destination  of aggregate  exports  are analyzed.  Section  IV  provides  a 
significantly  more detailed  and  disaggregated  analysis  of the region's 
composition  of trade with special emphasis  on  intraregional  trade.  Unfort- 
unately,  due to the lack  of current data  this analysis  only covers  until 
1984.  The information  available,  however,  is detailed  enough  as to  provide 
a  broad picture of the recent  trends.  In Section  V  we discuss  the issue of 
protectionism 
-  -  both in the rest  of the world  as well  as in the region 
-  - 
and  the future evolution  of LatIn America's  trade.  Section  VI deals  with 
the possible  role  of enhanced  intraregional  trade in the aolution  of  the 
debt crisis.  Finally  Section  VII contains the concluding  remarks. 
II.  The Evolution  of Latin  America's  Corercial Policy 
11.1  General Trends 
Until  the 1930s  the external  sector in  the great  majority  of the Latin 
American  countries  was highly  opened; exchange  controls were almost  nonexis- 
tent,  import  tariffs were  very low, and the "rules of the game" were 
strictly  followed.  All of this  ended  with the great depression;  at that 
time an epoch  of import  substitution  and protectionism  beganJ 
During  the 1950s  and 1960a, under  the intellectual  leadership  of the 
United  Nations  Economic  Commission  for Latin America  (ECLA/CEPAL),2  and its 
charismatic  Secretary  General  Raul  Prebisch,  most of  the Latin  American 3 
countries  embarked  on  ambitious  industrialization  programs based on import 
substitution.  This strategy  was based  on  the premise  that high import 
tariffs and other  impediments  to international  trade would  provide  temporary 
protection  to the domestic  manufacturing  sector.  According  to this approach 
after  some time the domestic  firms would  have "learned",  and  protection 
would  not be necessary  any more (Prebisch 1984).  Things,  however,  did not 
work  out as predicted  by the theory, and protection  became a permanent 
feature.  As a result,  in  most of the Latin American  countries  the indust- 
rial  sector  developed  under the barriers  of  protection;  this industrial 
sector  was largely  inefficient  and used  highly  capital  intensive  techniques 
(Krueger 1980,  1983). 
During  the 1950s  and first half of  the l960s  it  became apparent  that 
the import substitution  strategy  was losing dynamism.  Although  the easier 
and  more obvious  imports had already been  substituted,  these countries 
remained  highly "dependent" on imported  intermediate  inputs  and capital 
goods.  At the same time the highly  overvalued  domesr[c  currencies  conspired 
against  the development  of a dynamic export  sector, with the consequent 
scarcity  of foreign  exchange.3 
During  the late  l960s  a mild  reaction  against excessive  protectionism 
started  to take place  in some  countries.  In  Colombia,  for example,  there 
was an  important  move towards export  promotion  schemes  (Diaz Alejandro 
1976).  Also,  and as is discussed  in  greater detail  below,  during  this 
period  some serious efforts were made to create  common  markets  comprising 
either  all Latin  American  countries  or subgroups of them.  In that respect 
the creation  of  the Latin  American  Free Trade Association,  the Andean  Group 
and the Central American  Common  Market  were particularly  important. 
Although  in  some regards  these  integrationist  schemes were successful,  they 4 
did not turn  around  the region's  economies,  and in many  cases  the external 
sector --  and  the excessive  protectionism  -- was still seen  as the "weak 
link" by most  analysts.4 
During  the second  half  of the 1970s a larger  and larger number  of 
countries  began to  recognize  the benefits  of export  promotion,  and some of 
them  began to  rationalize  their external  sector.  This  process was supple- 
mented  by significant  debt inflows from  the international  banking  system. 
This  opening  up process  was particularly  important  in the countries  of the 
Southern  Cone (Edwards 1985,  Calvo 1986).  In  August  of 1982, immediately 
following  Mexico's  formal  announcement  that  it was facing  serious  financial 
difficulties,  the international  financial  community  greatly  reduced  the 
amount  of funds  intermediated  to the developing  world.  Even  some countries, 
such as Colombia,  which in  no way faced payments  problems,  had serious 
macroeconomic  disequilibria,  or had accumulated  debt  at a very fast  pace, 
were affected  by this reduction  in  foreign  lending.  In fact,  it is fair to 
say that  the availability  of  foreign funds was reduced in  a brutal  way.  For 
the developing  world as a whole,  external  financing  was reduced  by almost  40 
percent between  1981 and 1983.  Moreover,  the major debtors were  forced  to 
fully  close  a current  account deficit that  in 1982  exceeded  $50  billion in 
less than  3 years.  By  1985 the aggregate  current  account had reached 
virtual equilibrium  ($-0.l billion).  In order  to achieve  this significant 
adjustment  these countries  had to engineer a major  turnaround  in  their trade 
balance,  which  went from  an  aggregate  deficit  of almost  $7 billion in 1981 
to a surplus  of more than  $40 billion  in  1984. 
During  the initial  stages of  the adjustment  process,  most Latin 
American  nations  resorted  to an  extraordinary  increase  in protectionism  as 
the most rapid  and effective  (although not efficient)  way of reducing 5 
imports.  In some countries  the extent  of trade restrictions  has recently 
been somewhat  relaxed,  while  other have announced  some  easing  up in the'near 
future.  In  Chile, for exsmple,  tariffs  were reduced  to a 20% uniform  level. 
Mexico  has taken  some steps  towards reducing  the coverage  of  licenses,  while 
in Bolivia  as part  of the stabilization  program aimed  at stopping  hyperin- 
flation,  quotas have  been abolished  and tariffs reduced.  In many countries 
trade  liberalization  packages  are being  discussed  as a part of 
conditionality  agreements  with the multilateral  institutions.  All in all, 
however,  in mid-1988  the level of trade restrictions  remain  very high in 
most of the region. 
11.2  Latin  America's  Historical  Attempts  at Rezional  Trade Intezrptiort 
The first modern  attempts  at  commercial  integration  date  back to the 
late 1950s  and early 1960s.  The rationale  for these attempts,  however, 
cannot  be found on the traditional  (static) trade-creation  effects  predicted 
by the customs  unions  theory.5  Instead, commercial  integration  in Latin 
America  was perceived  and advocated  as the only  alternative  to overcome  the 
problems  related  to the inadequate  scale  of  domestic markets.  Also,  it was 
thought  that  regional  integration would  help  overcome  the existing  diffi- 
culties  of substituting  the importation  of the full  range  of intermediate 
and capital  goods. 
In  effect,  it was basically  as an  attempt to extend  the import 
substitution  strategy  --  and as  a  response  to the urgings  of ECIA --  that 
six South American  countries  and Mexico  established  the Latin  American  Free 
Trade Area (LAFTA/AIALC)  and four Central American  nations  created  the 
Central American  Common  Market (CACM) in  1960.  These  attempts  at commercial 
integration  were followed  by the creation  of  two other subregional  common 
markets  -  -  the  Caribbean  Free  Trade  Association  (CARIFTA)  in 1965  and the 6 
Andean  Group (AG) in 1969  -  -  and  ended up with the replacement  of LAFTA  by 
the Latin  American  Integration  Association  (LAIA/ALADI)  in  1980. 
In general,  the differences  among  these  institutions  are not restricted 
to the number  and relative homogeneity  of their members,  but also lie on 
their  attempted  goals and on the  mechanisms  designed  to  achieve  them, as 
well as on their  accomplishments.  As a way to provide  a basic  framework  for 
the understanding  of the current  state and future  prospects  of this process, 
this section  provides  a  brief review of the most salient features  of the 
different  attempts  at  commercial  integration  in Latin  America  in the last 
three  decades. 
11.2.1.  The Latin American  Free  Trade  Area 
The Treaty  of  Montevideo,  signed  in 1960 and put into  effect  on  June 1, 
1961,  created  the Latin  American  Free Trade Area (LAFTA/ALALC)  comprised  of 
Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile, Mexico,  Paraguay,  Peru  and  Uruguay  (the two remain- 
ing South American  countries,  Bolivia  and  Venezuela,  joined  the association 
only in 1966 and 1967,  respectively).  The main  objective  of LAFTA  was the 
gradual elimination  of trade barriers  and the progressive  reduction  of 
tariffs affecting  intraregional  trade flows.  The goal of an almost 
completely  liberalized  regional  market  was scheduled  to be accomplished  after 
a 12-year  transition  period  of  continuous  multilateral  negotiations.  The 
countries  agreed  on  following  a product-by-product  negotiation  strategy 
regulated  by GATT-type  principles  of most favored nation  and reciprocity. 
The latter was designed  to  provide more favorable  treatment  to the least 
developed  countries  of the region  (Bolivia and Ecuador). 
In order to achieve  its goal  of a gradual  liberalization  of 
intraregional  trade  flows LAFTA  established  three mechanisms:  the  "national 
lists",  the "common  lists"  and the agreements  for industrial 7 
complementation.  The items  included  in  the "national  lists" were those  for 
which  each country agreed  to reduce  nominal  tariffs by at least 8% per year. 
The negotiations  concerning  the products  each  country  was to include  in 
these  lists were scheduled  to be conducted  annually.  The "common  lists",  on 
the other  hand,  included  those producta  in which  jj  countries  agreed  to 
have fully  liberalized  -- i.e., zero  tariffs and no quantitative  restric- 
tions  -  -  intraregional  trade by the end of  the transition  period.  The 
Treaty  established  that negotiations  regarding  this list  should  be carried 
out every  3 years  and that  the members  should progressively  increase  the 
number  of items  included on it, in order  to fulfill the objective  of having 
75% of the intraregional  trade subject  to this treatment  by 1972.  Finally, 
the agreements  for industrial  complementation  were supposed  to constitute 
the mechanisms  for coordinating  at a regional  level the industrial  policies 
in those  sectors  in which  the volume  of intraregional  trade was too low or 
nonexistent. 
This  attempt  at commercial  integration,  however,  faced serious 
obstacles  almost  since  its inception.  Pressures  for the extension  of the 
original  12-year  transition  period  began  to build  up just  after the first 
round  of  negotiations.  After successive  postponements  and amendments  of the 
liberalization  schedule,  this was finally  extended  until  1980.  On the other 
hand,  despite  an  auspicious  start,  the number  of  items  added each  year to 
the  "national  list" of the member  countries  experienced  a rapid  and abrupt 
reduction.  As can be seen  in  Table  1,  the total number  of tariff  conces- 
sions  granted  by LAflA  members on their  "national  lists" more than doubled 
between  1962 and 1968, but almost  stagnated  from then on.  By 1968 the 
countries  had already  granted 93% of the total concessions  they  had given  by 
the end of the LAflA agreement  in  1980.6 8 
The other  two mechanisms  designed  by LAflA  performed  even  worse.  Only 
one "common  list" was negotiated  and approved  in 1964, but it  never became 
effective,  while the agreements  for industrial  complementation  covered  very 
few sectors, moat of which  were dominated  by  multinational  corporations 
located  in  the three larger  countries  (Argentina,  Brazil  and Mexico). 
The relative  failure of the negotiation  mechanisms  was also reflected  in 
the sluggish  evolution  of  the volume  of  intraregional  trade.  Table  1 shows 
that the percentage  of  LAFTA'a exports  directed  to the regional market  only 
increased  from  7.6% to 11.4% between  1962-64 and 1971-72.  After  a decrease  in 
the period  1973-74  caused  by the oil crisis,  this  ratio  remained  quite  stable 
at a level lower  than  14% until the dissolution  of LAflA  in 1980. 
A key factor  to understand  the very limited success  of LAflA  in 
promoting  a vigorous  increase  in the level  of  intraregionsl  trade  can  be 
found  in  the type of  products  for which  tariff  concessions  were granted. 
Most of the items  included  in  the "national  lists" of  the member  countries 
were either  primary products  (on which  trade within  the region  had been 
traditionally  based)  or  commodities  that  had never been  produced  in the 
region.  In  this sense,  the slow  acceleration  in  the volume  of intraregional 
exports  seems  to  have been  just  a consequence  of making  the whole  scheme 
dependent  on  the intensification  of  the traditional patterns  of  trade  within 
the region. 
Among  the different  explanations  that  the literature  on the subject has 
provided  for this modest  overall  result of the LAflA  experience  we have:7 
(1)  the absence  of a mechanism  that  would  have prevented  an uneven  distri- 
bution  of the costs  and  benefits  of  the integration process  among  the 
heterogeneous  members  of  LAflA;  (2)  the favorable  effect generated  by the 
abundance  of capital  inflows in  the early  1970s on LAFA  countries'  foreign exchange  constraints;  (3)  the nonexistence  of provisions  for the 
coordination  of  macroeconomic  policies  within  the members;  (4)  the costly 
bargaining  process  implicit  in a product-by-product  negotiation  technique; 
and  (5)  the inherent  conflict  that  exists between  a domestic  import  sub- 
stitution  strategy  and a commercial  integration  scheme.  Even  though  there 
is no doubt  that factors  (1)  through  (4) played  a role  in the disappointing 
outcome  of the LAflA attempt,  it can also  be said  that  all of them  were,  in 
one way or another,  a consequence  of the conflict between  the goals  of 
import  substitution  end those of a genuine  integration  process. 
In  effect,  the underlying  rationale  of all these  explanations  seems  to 
be the existence  of a basic misperception  of the significant  costs  involved 
in  the attempt  to extend  the import  substitution  strategy  to a regional 
level.  The fact that  potential  regional  imports of manufacturing  products 
were even  more competitive  with  domestic  production  than  the permitted 
imports  from  third  sources made the highly  protected  import  competing  sector 
of each  country  to strongly  oppose  the scheduled  liberalization.  The large 
efficiency  differentials  among  the industrial  sectors  of LAFTA  members only 
exacerbated  this  problem.  This  also  explains  why the integration  process 
experienced  a halt in  the late l960s, precisely  when its further progress 
required  granting  tariff  concessions  on the highly  protected  durable and 
nondurable  consumer  goods  sector. 
The reaction  of LAFTA  members  to this paralysis  of the integration 
process varied  widely;  it went from  the early  creation  of  the Andean  Group 
by a subgroup  of  nations  in 1969, to  the final replacement  of LAFTA  by the 
more  modest,  in  terms  of  goals,  Latin American  Integration  Association 
(l.AIA/ALADI) in  1980.  By that time, however,  the trade orientation  strategy 
of most countries  of  the region  had already experienced  a drastic  change. 10 
11.2.2  Central American  and Caribbean  Exoeriences  With Common  Market 
Arrangements 
i)  The Central American  Common Market 
The first movements  towards commercial  integration  in Central  America 
consisted  of a series of bilateral  trade agreements  established  among  the 
five countries  of  the region  in  the 1950s.  The integration  process  was 
accelerated  at the end of that  decade when,  with the assistance  of ECLA, 
some  of these countries  attempted  to extend  their  import substitution 
strategy  by implementing  a regional  industrialization  scheme  based on 
"integration-industries"  previously  allocated  among  the members.  However, 
those  countries  with  a more  advanced  industrial  sector  (Guatemala  and El 
Salvador)  demonstrated  their strong  opposition  to this  approach  by signing, 
together  with  Honduras,  a free  trade  agreement  ("Treaty of Economic  Associa- 
tion")  in February  of  1960.  This  agreement  was ratified  by Nicaragua  in 
December  of  the same  year  with the signature  of the "General Treaty  of 
Economic  Integration",  which  created the Central American  Common  Marker 
(CACM/MCCA).8  The terms  of the treaty  implied  the immediate  adoption  of 
free intraregional  trade in most  manufacturing  commodities  and the 
establishment  of a five-year  schedule  for the elimination  of tariffs  on the 
remaining  items  (mainly agricultural  products)  as well as for the 
harmonization  of a coinon  external  tariff  structure.  The treaty  also 
considered  the creation  of a regional payments  regime administered  by a 
Central  American  Clearing  House, which  was established  in July 1961. 
There was remarkable  progress  during  the first years of the treaty.  By 
1966  more than  94% of  the items  of  the CACM tariff  classification  (NAUCA) 
were subject to free trade within  the region  and to a common  external  tar- 
iff.  As a consequence,  intraregional  trade  experienced  a spectacular 11 
growth; Table  2 ahowa how the proportion  of CACM's  exporta  traded in  the 
regional  market  increased  from  7.8% to 24.2% between  1961  and 1968. 
However,  this transition  towards a fully  liberalized  regional  trade waa 
marked  by the continuous  complaints  of  the poorer  membera  of the agreement 
(Honduras and Nicaragua)  regarding  the asymmetry  in  the distribution  of  the 
benefits  of the common  market.  This  discontent,  reflected  in  these 
countries'  balance of  payments  deficits  and coupled  with adverse  external 
terms of trade  in  the late 1960s, led to  the imposition  of a 30% "temporary" 
surcharge  on the common  external  tariff  in 1967, and prompted  Nicaragua  to 
implement  discriminatory  measures  against  the other  CACM  members  in  1968.  A 
related  event was  the July 1969 "Soccer War"  between  Honduras  and El 
Salvador  that  resulted  in  the withdrawal  of Honduras  from  the CACM  in 
December  of 1970. 
In spite of the disruptive  effects of  these  circumstances,  particularly 
of  Honduras'  withdrawal,  an  improving  external  environment  allowed  the 
remaining  four countries  to continue with the intraregional  free trade 
agreement  during  the l970s.  Moreover,  the continuous  attempts  of  Honduras 
to re-enter  the common  market  had the effect of not altering  drastically  the 
pattern  of  trade within  the region.  In  fact, Table  2 shows  that  by 1974 
intraregional  exports  accounted  for more  than  25% of total exports  of  the 
region.  The evolution  of this  ratio  not only  contrasts  with the poor 
performsnce  of LAFTA  in the same  period, but is also  higher  than  similar 
indicators  for all the other  commercial  integration  groupings  among 
developing  countries. 
The most common  explanation  given  to the good  performance  of  this 
integration  attempt  stresses  the economic homogeneity  of their members  and 
the lack  of political  strength of their domestic  import  competing  sectors. 12 
It is precisely  because  of these reasons that  Cline (1983) sustains  that the 
liberalization  strategy  followed  by CACM  cannot  be generalized  to broader 
commercial  integration  schemes  in Latin  America.  Even if  Cline's  statement 
is  correct,  and despite  the negative  effects that  the severe  internal prob- 
lems  and the adverse  external  shocks  surrounding  the debt  crisis have  had on 
intraregional  trade flows,  the CACM  stands out as the most successful  of  all 
the attempts  at liberalizing  intraregional  trade  that  have  been  made in 
Latin  America. 
ii)  The Caribbean  Exoeriences  with  Common  Markets:  CARIVA  and CARICOM 
The attempts  at commercial  integration  among  the very small  and 
extremely  open  Caribbean  economies  date  back  to the mid-l960s.  In 1965, 
articles  of a Caribbean  Free Trade Association  (CARIFrA)  were subscribed  by 
Antigua,  Barbados  and Guyana.  This agreement  was ratified  three  years  later 
(in May 1968), by eight  other Caribbean  countries  (Jamaica, Trinidad  and 
Tobago, Grenada,  Dominica,  St. Lucia,  St. Vincent,  Montserrat  and St. Kitts- 
Nevis-Anguilla);  the remaining  Caribbean  nation,  Belize, only joined  the 
10 
association  in  1971. 
The CARIFTA  agreement  immediately  freed most  of the trade  among member 
countries  from import  and export  dutiea  and from  nontariff  barriers.  A five 
year schedule  for the elimination  of  intraregional  tariffs was designed  for 
the few import-aubstituting  products  exempted  from the regulation.  However, 
the agreement  did not consider  any  measure  related  to the imposition  of a 
common  external  tariff.  Intraregional  trade  increased  significantly  after 
the establishment  of  CARIFTA;  between  1967 and 1973 the share  of  intrareg- 
ional  trade rose from  approximately  7.8 percent  to 11 percent. 
The gains  from  this integration  process,  however,  were strongly  biased 
in favor  of  the more  developed  countries  of the agreement  which accounted 13 
for more than  90 percent  of intraregional  trade.  Given  this  asymmetry  in 
the distribution  of  benefits,  the less developed countries  of CARIFTA 
exerted  pressure  for a broadening  of  the scope  of  integration.  In  particu- 
lar, these countries  were  concerned  with the establishment  of mechanisms 
that  could  imply  a more favorable  treatment  for them  within the agreement. 
As a result of  this situation  the Caribbean  Community  (CARICOM) was 
established  in August  of 1973.  Its objectives went further  than  commercial 
integration,  since  they also involved  the harmonization  of monetary  and 
fiscal  policies  and the creation  of planning  agencies  for agricultural  and 
industrtnl  development.  Also,  a common  external  tariff  for imports  from 
nonmember  countries  was established.  Despite  the almost  immediate  adoption 
of  the common  external  tariff,  the adverse  external terms  of trade caused  by 
the oil shock prompted  protectionist  responses 
-  -  in the form  of restrictive 
import  licensing 
- -  from Guyana  and Jamaica.  This action  not only affected 
negatively  the level  of  intraregional  trade  - -  which  share  in total trade 
dropped  to 8% in  1975 and 7% in 1976  -- but also  provoked  antagonism  and 
retaliatory  responses  from the other members  of CARICDM.11 Although  some 
conciliatory  measures  were subsequently  attempted,  the share of intrareg- 
ional trade has remained  in  the neighborhood  of 7% in  the following  years 
and the trade  flows have still been  heavily  concentrated  among  the four more 
developed  countries  of the region.  These  facts  seem  to indicate  that  the 
wide differences  in  the economic  size of  the members,  and the lack  of 
diversification  of their productive  structures,  constitute  insurmountable 
obstacles  for a successful  commercial  integration within  this region. 
11.2.3  The Andean  Group 
As pointed out in Section 11.2.1,  one of the consequences  of the 
inoperacy  of LAFTA  was  the formation  of  the Andean  Group (AG) by five of  its 14 
middle-size  members.  In  1969 Bolivia,  Colombia,  Chile,  Ecuador  and Peru 
signed  the Cartagena  Agreement  with the explicit  goal of  avoiding  the incon- 
sistencies  that  determined  the poor  performance  of  LAFI'A.12  These 
optizuistic  expectations  were based on the relative  economic  homogeneity  of 
the AG members  and on  the by-then  widely  accepted  conception  that  a compre- 
hensive  industrial  planning  strategy was the prerequisite  of a successful 
deepening  of  the integration  process. 
Within  these  expanded  framework,  the AG established  as its objeccives: 
(1)  a progressive  liberalization  of intraregional  trade;  (2)  the gradual 
achievement  of a common  external  tariff;  (3)  the emphasis  on  regional 
investment  programs  designed  to  balance  the costs  and  benefits  of  the inte- 
gration  process  among  the member  countries,  and  (4)  the establishment  of a 
code for the common  treatment  of foreign direct  investment.  The specific 
mechanisms  designed  to  achieve  these objectives  allowed  for a special  treat- 
ment of the less developed  countries  of the region 
-  -  Bolivia and Ecuador. 
In this sense, with  respect  to the first two objectives,  the AG 
countries  agreed  that  Colombia,  Chile, Peru  and Venezuela  should  carry out 
an automatic  yearly  reduction  of  their average  tariff  level  of the order of 
7% of the initial  tariff  structure,  in order  to achieve  a complete  liberal- 
ization  of their  trade  flows by  1980.13  By that  time  the common  external 
tariff  of the region  was supposed  to be already  in  practice.  In  the cases 
of Bolivia  and Ecuador,  however,  this liberalization  was expected  to start 
only  in 1980,  and to be completed  by 1990.  Although  the automaticity  of 
this liberalization  schedule  contrasts with the inefficient  product-by-prod- 
uct strategy  adopted  by LAflA,  the AG scheme exempted  several  items from the 
proposed  tariff  reduction.  It was argued  that the allocation  of industries 
in those  sectors  should  be a result of  the regional  investment  program. 15 
With respect to the last  objective 
- -  the  establishment  of common  rules 
governing  foreign  investment  --  the  AG contemplated  two mechanisms  that  were 
supposed  to alter  significantly  the industrial  configuration  of the region: 
the reallocation  of some multisectoral  industries  that already  existed  among 
the member  countries  -  -  as  a way  to  distribute  more equally  the potential 
benefits  provided  by the expanded  market  -  -  and  the programming  of new 
investments  in  eight  "strategic"  industrial  sectorsJ4  Finally,  the Andean 
countries  agreed  to maintain  permanent  negotiations  on the issue of foreign 
direct  investment  until  a code for its common  treatment  could  be unanimously 
approved. 
Although  the results obtained  by the Andean  Group  are better  than those 
achieved  by LAFTA, they  are much less spectacular  than  what its members 
originally  expected.  The proportion  of AG's exports traded  in  the regional 
niarket  increased  from  a low value  of 1.7 percent  in 1970 to  4.5 percent  in 
1979,  and since  then  has remained  stable  in  the neighborhood  of 4 percent. 
The main factors  determining  this meager  achievement  seem to have  been the 
excessive  number  of exemptions  granted on the tariff  liberalization 
schedule,  the serious  difficulties  faced by the members  in  the design  of the 
common  external  tariff  and the inconsistency  between  the regional  industrial 
planning  strategy  and the particular  trade regime prevailing  on each  of the 
member  countries. 
The importance  of  the generalized  granting  of  exemptions  is reflected 
by the fact  that,  as of 1980, more than  25 percent  of the items  included  in 
the NABANDINA  tariff  nomenclature  had not been subject to the tariff 
liberalization  process.  On the other  hand,  the differences  in  the level  and 
dispersion  of  the protective  structure  of the AG  members  generated  divergent 
positions  regarding  the appropriate  timing, and the optimal  level  of  the 16 
common  external  tariff.  The problem was exacerbated  by the overvaluation  of 
most of the members'  real exchange rates  and the existence  of different 
exchange  rate  practices  within  the region  thet  made it more difficult  to 
measure  the effective  rate of  protection  received  by any activity  in some 
particular  countryJ5  Overall,  the fact that  the members'  positions  in  this 
particular  respect  seemed  irreconcilable,  and thet  the common  external 
tariff  was never  accomplished,  influenced  negatively  the commercial 
integration  process  within  the Andean  Group. 
The failure  of  the regional  industrial  planning  strategy also 
contributed  to the slowdown  of  the integration  process.  As of 1985 only 
three  of  the eight  investment  programs  in "strategic"  sectors had been 
approved  (on the petrochemical,  metalmechanic  and automobile  sectors)  and 
not a single  regional  reallocation  of  the previously  established  multisec- 
toral  industries  had  been carried  out.  This  put in  evidence,  once  again, 
the incompatibility  of  the national  industrialization  objectives  with the 
attempts  to extend  the import  substitution  strategy  to a regional  level;  it 
seems  extremely  difficult  for domestic producers  to internalize  the 
potential  benefits  stemming  from  a regional  liberalization,  even if  the 
latter  is carried  out properly. 
Finally,  the attempt to  coordinate  the region's  position  towards  direct 
foreign  investment  ended  up constituting  another  disruptive  factor.  The 
approval  of the Andean  Code for Foreign Investment  -  -  better known  as 
Decision  24 -  -  which severely  limited the share of foreign capital in 
industries  operating  within  the region, provoked  the withdrawal  of  Chile 
from  the Andean  Group in  1976 and caused a slight  decrease  in  the inflow  of 
this type  of private  capital to the remaining  members. 17 
As a whole,  then,  the mechanisms  designed  by the AG for deepening  the 
integration  process  among  its members  (the industrial  programming  scheme and 
the common  external  tariff),  have  not been  successful.  However,  there  seems 
to exist  a consensus  in  the sense  that with  a less interventionist  approach 
and a more comprehensive  liberalization,  there are still  significant  gains 
to be obtained  from  a commercial  integration  arrangement  within  this region. 
11.2.4 The Latin  American  Inteeration Association 
The recognition  of the benefits  of export promotion  policies  and the 
adoption  of a more outward oriented  strategy  by most Latin  American  count- 
ries in the late 1970s,  coupled with the poor  performance  of  the 
comprehensive  integration  processes  attempted  until  then,  determined  the 
replacement  of LAFTA  by the Latin American  Integration  Association  (LAIA/ 
ALADI)  in 1980.  This new arrangement  substituted  the ambitious  goal of 
establishing  a free trade area  within  Latin  America  for the more pragmatic 
objective  of facilitating  the negotiation  of  bilateral  commercial  agreements 
that  might  be later  generalized  to  other  countries  of the region. 
In  this sense,  the basic  mechanisms  designed by LAIA  are bilateral 
tariff negotiations 
- -  that should  allow  for the possibility  of  being  later 
on extended  to other  members  - -  and  the granting  of regional  tariff 
preferences  by each of  the member  countries.  These  tariff  preferences, 
however,  are not subject  to any pre-determined  schedule  and do  not intend  to 
be a part of a common  external  tariff  for the region. 
The increased  efficiency  of  the negotiation  strategy  adopted by LAIA, 
together with the realism  of its objectives,  reflect  a clear  change  in the 
expected  role of commercial  integration  arrangements  in  Latin America.  From 
being  conceived  as the extension  of  domestic  import substitution  strategies 
to a regional  level,  they  are now perceived  as a component  of an overall 18 
outward-oriented  strategy  that can contribute  to  enhance  export  growth  for 
the region  as a whole,  without  discriminating  excessively  against  other 
trade partners. 
III.  Latin  America's  International  Trade:  Aggreaste  Trends 
In this section we analyze  the evolution  of Latin  America's  direction 
of foreign  trade  at an  aggregate  level.  Table  3 contains  data on the dollar 
value of  imports  and exports for fourteen Latin  American  countries  for sel- 
ected  years  between  1970  and 1985.  This table  shows that  for most countries 
the  (nominal) dollar  value  of imports peaked  between  1980  and 1982,  only  to 
experience  a dramatic  fall in the years  following  the eruption  of the debt 
crisis.  Aa can be seen, in every  single  country the  (nominal)  dollar  value 
of imports in 1985  was well  below its 1980 level.  For these  14  countries  as 
a  whole the (nominal)  dollar  value  of imports was, in 1985, 36 percent below 
its 1980  value.  Moreover,  when expressed  in  real dollar  terms,  1985 total 
imports  are 45 percent  below  their  1980 value6  Of  course,  this  mainly 
reflects  the reduction  in  imports required  by the adjustment  programs  imple- 
mented  by these countries  after  the 1982  debt  crisis  that was discussed  in 
Section  11.1.  The evolution  of the value  of  exports  in  Table  3 also 
reflects  the effects  of the adjustment  programs.  In a  number  of these 
countries  -- Argentina, Brazil,  Ecuador and  Mexico  -- the  value  of exports 
was in  1985 significantly  above  its 1980 value.  This  was achieved  in  spite 
of the fact  that for most  of the countries  in  the region  the international 
prices  of  their  exports declined  quite substantially  during  the period  (see 
Edwards  l988a). 
Table 4 contains  data on an indicator of these  economies  degree  of 
openness:  the ratio  of total trade  (imports  exports) to  GOP.  Although 19 
the index differs  from  country-to-country,  it is still possible  to draw  as a 
general pattern  of behavior  that  there was a fairly  significant  increase  in 
the degree  of openness  in  the l970s.  This general move towards greater 
openness  is revealed  both when 1975 is compared with 1970 as when 1980  is 
compared  with 1970.  Generally  speaking,  the available  evidence  strongly 
indicates  that  the 1970s  was a decade  where  most  of the nations  of Latin 
America  became  more open  to  the rest  of  the world.  In  fact,  Edwards  (1988d) 
shows  that this claim  is supported  by the evolution  of  the level  of import 
tariffs  and  other impediments  to trade during  this  period.  Table  4 also 
shows  that  during  the first half  of the 1980s  the trend  towards greater 
openness  was drastically  reversed,  with  the openness  index exhibiting  a 
sharp drop for most countries.  This, of course, was partially  the consequ- 
ence  of che debt  crisis  and of the significant  cut in imports that the 
adjustment  policies  required.  As can be seen  in  Table  4, in  the case of  the 
tocal  crade  to GDP ratio,  in  9 of the 14  countries  there  was a decline 
between  1980 and 1985.17 
111.1  The Origin  of  Aggregate  Imnorts 
In this subsection  we focus on the recent  evolution  of intraregional 
trade  by analyzing  the behavior  of  different  countries  shares of the value 
of Latin  America's  imports at an  aggregate  level.  In order  co have a 
general  picture  and a better  understanding  of the way in  which regional 
trade  has performed,  we also look  in  some detail  at the way other  countries' 
shares  of regional  imports have evolved.  In particular  we inquire on how 
the share  of  the OECD -- which  comprises  the region's  most important  trade 
partners  -- has  evolved  through time. 
Tables  5 contains  data  on the percentage  distribution  of  the value of 
imports  for 14 Latin  American  countries  for 1977-86.  These  data  give  us 20 
information  on what fraction of the U.S. dollar  value  of each of these 
countries'  imports  came  from industrialized  countries,  what share  corres- 
ponded  to intraregional  trade  -  -  imports  from  within  Latin  America  and the 
Caribbean  -  -  and  what  proportion  came from  the rest of  the world. 
Several  facts arise  from this table.  First,  notice that the 
distribution  of the origin  of imports varies  significantly  across  countries. 
While in some  of them  the industrialized  countries'  share  in total  imports 
is in  the 70 to 80 percent  range, in  others it is approximately  50 to 60 
percent,  while  still  in others  it is in  the order of 30 percent  (i.e. 
Uruguay).  Another  interesting  fact, that due to the aggregation  does  not 
emerge  from  the table,  is that for the great majority  of the Latin  American 
countries  there have  been no  perceptible  changes  in the proportion  of 
imports  coming  from the U.S.18  Third, in some  of the large and medium  size 
countries  either  in 1982 or 1983 there is a slight  drop  in the share of 
imports coming  from the industrialized  countries  (Argentina,  1982; Brazil, 
1982;  Chile  1982 and 1983; Mexico,  1983).  Finally,  in  8 of  these  countriea 
there was a slight  increase  in the industrialized  countries  market  share in 
1985 and 1986 (Argentina,  Brazil, Mexico,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  Colombia, 
Costa  Rica  and Ecuador). 
With respect  to  intraregional  trade, it is interesting  to note that  in 
the years  corresponding  to the debt  crisis, and  until 1983 or  1984,  in  al- 
most every country  there was a significant  increase  in  the share  of imports 
coming  from  the region.  The reason  for this has mainly  to do with the way 
in  which the import  compression  that followed the crisis  was distributed 
across  countries.  Most Latin  American  nations  reduced  imports  from  every 
source; however,  during  the initial years of the crisis  the drop in  total 
imports  greatly exceeded  the decline  in  imports  from  the region.  This 21 
increase  in the share  of intraregional  imports was reversed  in most 
countries  in  the last few years.  This reflects,  to a large extent,  the 
converse  of  the phenomenon  of  1982-83.  As these nations  have  been  able to 
increase  their  total  imports,  these have  mainly  come  from  outside  the 
region.  Overall,  Table  S shows  that the share  of  aggregate  imports coming 
from the region  stood  in 1986  significantly  above  its level  in the late 
1970s in most of the middle-income  and low-income  Latin  American  countries. 
For the majority  of  upper-middle  income countries  of the region,  however, 
the share  of  intraregional  imports has remained rather  stagnant,  or  has even 
decreased  -- as  in Mexico  -- in the last decade. 
111.2  The Destination  of  Aazreaate  Exvorts 
Table  6 contains  data  on the regional  destination  of aggregate  exports 
for a group of 16 Latin  American  countries  for 1970-83.  Given  that  this 
table permits  us to assess  which  markets sustained  the aggregate  expansion 
of  exports  from the region in  the adjustment  period,  an  additional  refine- 
ment  has been  made by explicitly  identifying  the export  shares  of LAIA/ 
ALADI,  the U.S.  and Japan. 
A number  of interesting  facts are revealed by this table.  First,  the 
last two years  show a reversal of the declining  trend  that  characterized  the 
evolution  of the share  of  exports  going to the OECD.  Furthermore,  regional 
exports to the U.S. have increased  substantially  after  the debt  crisis. 
This fact  seems  to indicate  that the U.S. market  has absorbed  most of  the 
regional  attempt  to close  its current  account gap.  Second,  after  reaching  a 
peak  in 1980,  intraregional  exports have  experienced  a significant  decline. 
This  implies that  the regional  market  has not been able to couple with  the 
region's  efforts  to increase  its foreign exchange  earnings.  The latter 
becomes  evident  if  we note that  in 1983  and 1984 the proportion  of intra- 22 
Latin  American  exports  reached  their lowest  value since  1970.  Finally, 
another  important  trend  captured. in  Table 6 is the steady  increase  in Latin 
American  exports going  to the rest (i.e., non-Japan)  of  Asia.  In general, 
then, the aggregate  trends seem  to indicate that  the regional market  posses- 
ses a rather  limited  absorption  capacity  for new Latin American  exports,  at 
least  during  periods  in which  the region  as a whole is trying  to  solve  acute 
external  disequilibria. 
IV.  Latin  American  International  Trade:  Disanreeated Data 
In  the preceding  section we investigated  the evolution  of Latin Amer- 
ica's aggregate  imports  and exports.  In  this section we ask  what is behind 
these aggregate  data.  In particular  we inquire on which  specific  products 
does Latin  America  import from  whom and exports to  whom.  As in the previous 
section our main interest  is with  the evolution  of intraregional  trade. 
The Economic  Commission  for Latin America  (ECLA/CEPAL)  constructs 
fairly  detailed  and  very reliable  data  on the region's  directions  of trade. 
Unfortunately  in their effort  to clean up the new data  obtained  from  UNCTAD, 
they  take  a long time checking  and rechecking  the figures.  This  means that 
any atudy  that  wants to rely on  these quality  data  has to use time series 
that end some years  back.  This paper  is no exception;  the disaggregated 
data discussed  here  only cover  the period  up to 1984.  At this point we can 
only rely  on some  preliminary  indicators  - -  including  some preliminary  ECLA 
figures 
- -  to predict  how these  directions  of trade have evolved  in  the last 
3 years  or so. 
ECLA  collects  disaggregated  data  at  the one digit  SITC  level;  thus in 
the analysis  that follows  it will  be possible  to distinguish  between  the 
following  goods'  categories: 23 
Foodstuffs  and Live  Animals 
Beverages  and Tobacco 
Raw Non-Food  Materials,  except Fuel 
Fuel  and related  products 
Oil, greases  and waxes  of vegetable  and animal  origins 
Chemical  products 
Manufactured  products 
Machinery  and transport  equipment 
Other manufactured  goods 
Other  commodities. 
IV.l  Couroosition and  Oriain  of Latin  American  Imoorts:  Disasarezated  Trends 
Table  7 shows  the composition  of imports in  our 16 Latin  American 
countries  taken as a whole.  It  reveals that the bulk of the region's 
imports has always been  concentrated  on  the manufacturing  sector (categories 
5,  6,  7 and 8), with capital  goods  (category  7) being the most important 
item.  However,  it also shows a clear  decline in the import  shares of 
categories  6 and 7  that  has been explained by a substantial  increase  in  the 
relative  importance  of fuel imports  (category 3). 
In  order  to isolate the effects  of  the oil shocks, which  affected 
asymmetrically  the countries  of the region, Tables  8  and 9 provide  disaggre- 
gated  information  on  the distribution  of  different  categories  of non-fuel 
imports among  the intraregional  market,  the U.S. and Japan  for 12  upper- 
middle-income  and middle-income  Latin  American  countries.  The 
disaggregation  used  here distinguishes  between primary  and manufactured 
products,  obtained  in the following  way:  (i)  Primary products:  Categories 
0, 1, 2 and 4 -- as  defined above,  (ii)  Manufactured  products:  Categories 
5,  6,  7 and 8.  The tables also include information  on the dollar  value  of 
-  Category 0: 
-  Category 1: 
-  Category 2: 
-  Category 3: 
-  Category 4: 
-  Category  5: 
-  Category  6: 
-  Category  7: 
-  Category 8: 
-  Category  9: 24 
imports of each  category  to get an idea of  their  relative magnitudes. 
From  these  tables  it is possible  to detect  some  common  patterns  across 
countries.  First, with the exception  of Uruguay  and Paraguay,  the U.S. 
remains  as the most important  supplier  of manufactured  imports  to the reg- 
ion.  The range  of  the U.S.  share of this type  of imports in Latin  America 
goes  from a low 17 percent 
- -  in the case of Paraguay 
- -  to  as high as 67 
percent  -- in the case of  Mexico.  A second  interesting  pattern  is related 
to  the increase  in  the share of intraregional  imports.  In moat Latin 
American  countries,  Mexico  being  the major  exception,  this increase  in  the 
participation  of imports  from  within  the region  has constituted  the 
counterpart  of the slight  loss  of  competitiveness  experienced  by the U.S. 
and some other  OECD  countries  in  the last decade.  As mentioned  in the 
previous  section,  this phenomenon  was particularly  clear  in  the asymmetric 
compression  of  intraregional  imports during  the enormous  adjustment  provoked 
by the debt crisis.  However,  it is also  clear  form the table  that, perhaps 
with the exception  of  Argentina,  the absolute  magnitude  of the share of 
manufactured  imports  from  within  the region  is relatively  large  only  for the 
smaller  countries  of Latin America. 
With respect  to agricultural  products,  it is important  to note the 
increase  in the share  of imports coming from  the U.S.  Except  for the cases 
of  Argentina,  Chile, Uruguay  and Paraguay,  the U.S.  has displaced  other 
Latin  American  and Caribbean  countries  as the main  provider  of  these  type  of 
goods.  Moreover,  by 1984  some of  these countries  imported  almost  half of 
their primary  products  from  the U.S. 
A further  disaggregation  of  these  trends  is provided  in  Tables  10 and 
11.  They  show  how each  of the two more important  Latin American  integration 
schemes  (LAflA  -- which  later  on  became  IAIA -- and  the CACM)  distribute 25 
their  imports of the different  "categories"  of  goods  añiong the different 
suppliers.  Each  cell in each  of these tables  indicate what  proportion  of 
that  particular  category  of good is imported by that integration  scheme  from 
that  specific  supplier.  Also,  the last  column  of these tables  reflect  the 
distribution  of  total  imports from the region  among  the different  suppliers. 
In this  way,  Table  10 shows that  imports  from  the members  of  i.AFTA-LAIA 
have  been concentrated  on  categories  7 (machinery),  5  (chemicals),  3 (fuel) 
2  (raw materials)  and 0  (foodstuffs).  With the exception  of  fuel, which is 
mainly  imported  from  OPEC countries,  the OECD countries  have  been,  by large 
margin,  the most important  suppliers  of these goods  to the region.  The 
table  also reveals  that  the increase in the share  of  intraregional  imports 
of manufactures  (category  6) and chemicals  (category  5) represent  the major 
achievement  of this integration  scheme in  the recent  years.  What is even 
more important  is that  this increase in intraregional  impdrts coincided  with 
the adoption  of the more  pragmatic  approach of the LAIA agreement 
-  aa 
opposed  to that  of LAFTA --  and,  more  recently,  with the drastic adjustment 
prompted  by the debt  crisis.  Finally,  this table  also shows  that the shares 
of  the other  integration  schemes  (CACM and CARICOM)  on the imports of LAIA 
members  have  been almost  insignificant,  although  this  fact  maybe explained 
by the enormous  differences  in the size  of the countries  involved  in each 
group. 
As shown  by Table  11, the distribution  of imports by origin  in  the 
countries  of the CACM is somewhat different  from  that  of the L.AIA membera. 
Although  the OECD countries  also constitute  the major  providers  of  all types 
of  goods,  except  fuel,  to  the CACM,  the countries  from  within  this region 
have consistently  remained  as the second  most important  suppliers  of 
imports.  The significant  difference  in  the magnitudes  of  the share  of 26 
intraregional  imports of the CACM and LAIA  arrangements  is a reflection  of 
the relative  success  of the integration  process in Central America already 
discussed  in subsection  11.2.2.  The substantial  decline  in  the CACM  share 
of  intraregional  imports in the recent  years,  on  the other  hand,  has to be 
interpreted  with caution since  it can  be just a consequence  of the political 
turmoil  that  has characterized  the region  since the late 1970s. 
P7.2  Structure  and Destination  of  Latin American  Exports: 
Disasarezated  Trends 
Given  the major  role  that a significant  increase  in Latin  American 
exports will  play in  the achievement  of a long  lasting  solution  to the 
region's  pressing  economic  problems,  it is important  to assess  what and to 
whom will  Latin  America  export  in  the following  years.  The analysis  of  the 
aggregate  trends of regional  exports made in subsection  111.2 have already 
shown  that  the intraregional  market  embodied  a somewhat  limited  capacity  to 
absorb  the substantial  increase  in  exportable  output  from  the region  in the 
mid-1980s.  The disaggregated  data  on the composition  of regional  exports 
presented  in  this subsection  will  permit us to identify  the type of  exports 
that  determined  this outcome. 
The data in  Table  12 describe  the evolution  of  the composition  of totsl 
and Non-Fuel  exports  of our sample of 16 Latin  American  countries.  Several 
facts emerge  from this table.  First,  the share of exports of foodstuffs  and 
agricultural  products (category 0) has declined  steadily  throughout  the per- 
iod.  Second, exports  of fuel  have increased  in importance  both as a result 
of the increases  in  the price  of oil and of  the larger  gas and oil 
production  in the region.  Third,  manufactured  exports  corresponding  to 
categories  5  (chemicals) and 7  (machinery) have experienced  an  important 
increase  in recenc  years.  This  trend  is more  clearly  captured  in the second 27 
panel  of the table  that excludes fuel exports:  whereas in 1970  categories  5 
and 7 represented  no more than  6 percent  of non-fuel  exports,  in  1984 they 
accounted  for 19.2  percent.  Finally,  these data also show  that  exports  of 
manufactures  (category  6) have mostly  maintained  their  relative  importance 
throughout  the period,  accounting  for less than  20 percent  of non-fuel 
exports. 
In order  to determine  which  trade partners  have supported  the export 
expansion  of Latin  American  countries,  Tables  13 to 15 provide  disaggregated 
information  on the destination  of  non-fuel  exports  for the Latin  American 
nations  grouped  according  to their  per capita  income.19  These  tables  show 
that those upper-middle  income Latin  American  countries  that  achieved  a 
substantial  increase  in manufactured  exports in the last years  (Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico,  Venezuela  and even  Chile), have  experienced  a decline  in  the 
proportion  of their exports  directed  to the regional  market.  In most cases 
this  lower  share  of intraregional  exports has implied an increase  in  the 
share  of  exports  to the U.S.,  confirming  the aggregate  trend captured  by 
Table  6.  The intraregional  share  of  manufactured  exports  in all the other 
countries  has not exhibited  that  much  of a trend, having  been this share 
particularly  large  for the Central American  countries,  With respect to 
primary  exports,  these  tables  reflect  that the U.S. constitutes  the most 
important  market  in  the majority  of  cases.  Although  the U.S. share has 
declined  in recent  years,  the shsre of incraregional  exports  of this type of 
products,  which  has rarely  been  larger  than  20  percent,  has not shown an 
increasing  trend. 
The more  disaggregated  data  contained  in Table  16 reveal even  more 
clearly how the substantial  increase  in  manufactured  exports of the LAIA 
members has been mostly  absorbed  by OECD  countries.  Between  1980 and 1984 28 
the regional  exports  of this type of goods increased  by 37 percent  (U.S. 
$6.7 billion),  while the share  of intraregional  exports  in  all these 
categories  declined  drastically.  Actually,  the exports  of  these  goods  to 
the region  only increased by 0.4 billion during  that  period. 
On the other hand,  the data in  Table  17 shows  that the large  share of 
intraregional  exports of manufactures  in the CACM  has not experienced  a 
significant  reduction  in recent  years.  However,  this  group  of countries 
have confronted  shocks of a very different nature  than  the ones faced  by 
LAIA  members,  as indicated by the fact  that  the nominal  value of these 
countries'  exports has decreased  since 1980. 
In  general,  then, the evidence  presented  in this subsection  seems  to 
indicate  that  a sustained  increase  in  Latin American  exports  -  -  particularly 
of  non-traditional  products 
- -  in  the present  circumstances  w4ll depend  more 
on these  nations'  ability  to diversify  their  exportable  output  and to  penet- 
rate industrialized  countries'  markets than  on the deepening  of 
intraregional  trade  agreements.  However,  the achievement  of this goal  will 
require not only  a more transparent  trade regime  in  the Latin  American 
countries,  but also a significant  decline in the protectionist  sentiments 
prevailing  in  the developed  nations.  To both of  these  issues  we turn  in  the 
following  section. 
V.  protectionism  and the Future Evolution  of Latin  Anerica's  International 
As noted  in Section  II, after  approximately  three  decades  of inward 
oriented  policies,  in the mid-l970s  a number  of Latin  American  countries 
started to move towards more outward oriented  trade regimes,  abandoning  the 
idea  of  extending  the import  substitution  process  to a regional  level. 
Although  this trend  towards greater  openness occurred  at different  speeds, 29 
it involved  a large number  of countries.  Edwards  (l988a), for example, 
reports  data  on average tariffs  that clearly show  that  several  countries  in 
the region  went through nontrivial  trade  liberalizations  up to the early 
1980s.  However,  the debt  crisis  and the need to reduce  imports very fast 
resulted  in  a dramatic  reversal of that  tendency.  As already mentioned  in 
the preceding  sections,  in  the mid-1980s  in  almost  every country  the degree 
of protectionism  exceeds  that  of  the beginning  of the decade. 
Although  there  is some  debate  on how desirable  it is for the developing 
nations  to move towards  trade,  there is wide agreement  that the Latin 
American  nations should  implement more transparent  and non-discriminatory 
outward  oriented  regimes.  Only  in this  way  will efficiency  increase  and the 
volume  of  international  trade,  and especially  exports, will grow fast 
enough.  In  fact, Mexico  is  already  energetically  moving  in that  direction. 
Tariffs,  of course, constitute  only  one form  of  protection,  and 
countries  in fact  use a large number  of other  mechanisms,  generally  known  as 
nontariff  barriers,  to introduce de facto wedges  between  domestic  and  world 
prices.  Nontariff  barriers  can take many  different  forms ranging  from 
prior-deposits  to outright  quotas.  The history  of  nontariff  barriera  in 
Latin  America  is long and generalized.  Thus,  in  order  for the region's 
volume  of trade 
- -  both  intraregional  and  with the reat  of the world -  -  to 
experience  a significant  increase both tariffs and the wide  variety of NTBs 
should  be drastically  reduced.  Multiple  exchange  rates  are another 
mechanism  used quite  extensively  by  the Latin American  nations  to obstruct 
trade  flows.  Interestingly  enough, intraregional  trade agreements,  and even 
the studies on NTB5, have not focused on this  protective  tool.  At this 
point a number  of  countries  in  the region  in fact  do have  multiple  rates. 30 
The lack of reliable  data  on NTBs has  generally  frustrated  analysts 
that  have tried  to assess  with some degree of  rigor  the extent of protection 
in  the developing  world.  For this reason in  a recent  massive  cross  country 
study undertaken  at the World  Bank,  an effort  to construct  subjective  "in- 
dexes  of  liberalization"  was made.  These  indexes are supposed  to  capture 
the extent  of trade  impediments,  including tariffs  and other  NTBs.  They are 
subjective,  in  the sense  that  they  don't  combine actual  objective  measurea. 
Although  there  are some  shortcomings  related  to this subjectivity,  including 
the nonverifiability  and noncomparability  across  countries,  their  construc- 
tion  has been  extremely  useful,  helping  understand  the evolution  of "true 
protectionism"  in some  of these countries.  For the five  Latin  American 
nations  included among  the 18 countries  covered  by the study,  the indexes 
reflect  both the protectionist  history  of  these  countries,  as well  as the 
efforts toward  non-discriminatory  liberalization  implemented  in the late 
1970s  and early 1980s  (see Michaely,  Papageorgiou  and Choksi,  1986). 
Unfortunately  the data available  on NTBs in  the developing  countries, 
and in particular  in  Latin  America,  are exceedingly  sketchy.  However,  a 
recent  study by  ALADI  (1984) provides  some indication  of the coverage  of  two 
forms  of  NTBs:  outright prohibitions  and prior  import  licenses.  Table 18 
summarizes  these data.  As can be seen  from  this table NTBs in Latin  America 
constitute  a serious  obstacle  and are as  prevalent,  if not more,  than in  the 
developed  countries. 
V.].  Macroeconomic  Disequilibrium  and Protectionist  Pressures 
An issue that has not been sufficiently  emphasized,  especially  by the 
supporters  of an active  integration  process,  is that Latin  America's  protec- 
tionist  history  has been intimately  related  to the region's macroeconomic 
instability.  A  common  scenario observed  again  and again can be described  as 31 
follows:  at some  point  in time the authorities  of  a-particular  country 
decide  to pursue  a fiscal  policy  that is inconsistent  with  the chosen  nomi- 
nal exchange  rate regime  -- usually  a pegged  rate.  Given  the underdeveloped 
nature  of the domestic capital  market,  the fiscal  expansion  is basically 
financed  with  domestic  credit  creation.  As a result, there will  be a loss 
of international  reserves,  domestic  inflation  will  exceed  world inflation, 
and the real exchange  rate will  become  increasingly  overvalued.  In an 
effort  to stop the drainage  of reserves  the authorities  will  usually  respond 
by imposing  exchange  controls  and  by increasing  the degree of  restrictive- 
ness of  the existing  trade  impediments 
-  - tariffs will  be hiked  and QR5 will 
be imposed.  Naturally,  as long  as the ultimate  causes of the macroeconomic 
disequilibrium  -- that is, the inconsistent  credit  and fiscal  policies  -- 
are  not tackled,  all the authorities  will  gain  by imposing new trade 
restrictions  is delay  the need  for corrective  macroeconomic  measures.  The 
real exchange  rate  will  become  more overvalued,  international  reserves  will 
continue  to decline,  and a  black  market  for foreign  exchange will emerge. 
At some point  this disequilibrium  situation  will  become  unsustainable,  and a 
stabilization  program  -- usually under  the aegis of the IMF -- will be 
enacted.  This  program  will usually  consist of a significant nominal 
devaluation  geared  at correcting  the over-valuation developed  in  the previous 
period,  and of a contractionary  macroeconomic  policy. 
Table  19 contains  data  on  the evolution  of import  tariffs,  exchange 
controls  and capital  controls  in  the period  preceding  17 balance  of payments 
crises in Latin  America.  The table  reveals that in the great majority  of 
the cases  the crisis  - - which  always took  the form  of a major  devaluation  - - 
was  preceded  by an important  piling  up of exchange controls  and restric- 
tions.  In some episodes,  such  as Colombia  in 1962  and 1967,  Ecuador  1961, 32 
and Peru in  1975,  the initial  conditions  (two years  prior  to the crisis) 
were already extremely  restrictive,  and became  even  tighter  as the erosion 
of reserves became  severe  and/or  real exchange rate  appreciation  became  more 
massive.  In other cases, however  -- Venezuela  1964 and Chile  1982,  for 
example  --  the  period  preceding  the devaluation was characterized  by a 
fairly  free  environment,  with little  restrictions  and  no attempts  by the 
authorities  to impose  any additional  controls. 
It is clear,  then,  that  to the extent  that the region  does  not 
implement  serious  and far-reaching  structural  reforms aimed  at avoiding 
macroeconomic  instability,  we can expect the recurrence  of periodic  balance 
of payment  crisis, with their  concomitant  negative  effects on the trade 
regime  and on  the volume  of  trade  - -  both  intraregional  and  with the rest of 
the world. 
V.2  Protectionism  in  the Industrialized  World 
As noted in subsection  IV.2, the  way in  which  Latin  America's  trade 
performs  will  not depend  exclusively  on  the region's  protectionist  policies. 
Equally  important,  if  not more,  is what  happena  with  trade impediments  in 
the industrial  nations. 
While  most Latin American  nations have  been going  through  almost  heroic 
efforts  aimed  at improving  their external  balance,  the industrial  countries 
have  been invaded with protectionist  sentiments.  In  fact,  in the past few 
years the industrial  countries  have used  a series of nontariff  mechanisms  to 
impede a freer  flow  of Latin  American  goods.  According  to the CATT (1984), 
industrial  countries  currently  use more than  forty nontariff  measures  to 
impede  international  flows  of  commodities. 
A few authors have dealt with the issue of nontariff  barriers, 
analyzing  the extent  of these practices,  their  coverage  across  countries  and 33 
products,  and their evolution  through time.  For example,  in a comprehensive 
recent  study Nogues  et  al.  (1986b) analyzed  the use of nontariff  barriers  in 
16 industrialized  countries.  For the purpose  of their analysis  they  defined 
the following  practicea  as  nontariff  barriers:  prohibitions,  quotas,  dis- 
cretionary  import  authorization,  conditional  import  authorizations, 
"voluntary"  export  restraints,  variable  levies, minimum  price  systems, 
"voluntary"  price  restraints,  tariff-quotas,  seasonal  tariffs, price  and 
volume  investigations,  and antidumping  and countervailing  duties.  Their 
analysis  suggests  that the coverage  of  this type  of impediments  is quite 
broad,  affecting  more than  one-fourth  of all these countries  imports, with 
textiles being the industry most severely affected. 
An important  question  is  whether  imports from  all countries  or regions 
are affected  in the same  way by the NTBs.  Nogues  et. al. found that this is 
not the case;  imports from  the developing  world  are more  severely  affected 
by this type of "semi-disguised"  protectionism  than  those  from  the indust- 
rialized  world.  A  study  by ECLA/CEPAL  (1986e), confirmed  this 
discriminatory  trend.  It found  that  the NTB5  of industrialized  countries, 
particularly  those of the EEC,  discriminate  strongly  against the exports 
coming  from Latin  American  LDCs.  Table  20 provides  a summary of these 
findings.  Once the effects  of  the NTBs  are taken  into  account  the degree  of 
protection  the industrialized  countries  grant  to some product can be quite 
remarkable.  Edwards  (l988a), for instance, provides  estimates  of the total 
average  rate of protection  to  which  some Argentinian  and Brazilian  exports 
to the EEC,  Japan  and the U.S. were subject  in 1980.  These figures are in 
many  ways staggering,  indicating  that  in many  cases  the NTBs more than 
double  the tariff  protection. 34 
What is even  more serious  is that  the existing  evidence  clearly 
indicates  a slow  but steady  increase  in  the degree  of coverage  of the NIBs. 
For example,  Nogues  et al. (1986a) found  that the NTBs  coverage  for all 
goods  in the 16 industrial  countries  increased by 1.5 percentage  points 
between  1981 and 1983.  To the extent  that  these NTRs increase,  or even if 
they  are maintained  at  their  current level, it will  become  very difficult  if 
not plainly  impossible,  for the Latin  American  countries  to continue  to 
increase  their exports  at the rate  required  to  solve  the current  debt 
crisis.  While  the main responsibility  for increasing  exports  rests  with the 
Latin  American  countries,  their  efforts, no matter  how serious,  can be 
easily  frustrated  by the protectionist  policies  of the industrialized  world. 
VI.  The Prosnects  for Intraregional  Trade  and the Debt Crisis 
Recently,  some authors have sustained  that  the adverse  external 
conditions  faced  by Latin  American  countries  in  the aftermath  of  the debt 
crisis  are the appropriate  ones for an  intensification  of the integration 
process in  the region.  They argue  that preferential  reductions  in  tariffs 
coupled  with an  effective  "deadollarization"  of intraregional  payments 
- - 
basically achieved  through  clearing  house-type  arrangements 
- - will revital- 
ize intraregional  flows of trade.  In  fact, in a recent  study  that analyzed 
the future prospects  of the integration  process  in Latin  America ECLA/CEPAL 
(1986d) postulated  that the adoption  of these types  of measures  would  be 
translated  in a sustained  increase  in  the growth  rate of  intraregional  trade 
flows.  Specifically,  the projections  that constituted  the benchmark  of that 
study  assumed that  as a consequence  of  those measures  the value of  intra- 
regional  trade would  grow at an annual  rate  of 16 percent in  the following 
years.  Table  21 reproduces  these projections  and shows how,  under  chose 35 
assumptions,  the share  of intra-LAIA  imports would  increase  from  15.9 
percent  in 1984 to 18.6%  in  1990 and to  22.2%  in  1994. 
The evidence  presented  in this  paper  indicates  that both the 
recommendations  and the projected  scenario  implied by such proposals  are 
fairly  unrealistic.  Although  there  is  agreement  that the Latin  American 
countries  should  implement  significant  reductions  in their  protective 
structures  and adopt more outward oriented  policies,  there  is no  justifica- 
tion for the presumption  that the efficacy  of these measures will be 
enhanced  by restricting  them to the regional market.  Moreover,  the LAF1A 
and the Andean  Group  experiences  have shown the significant  costs  involved 
and the meager  results  achieved  by regional  liberalizations  arrangements 
based  on multilateral  negotiations  of the type that would  be required,  for 
example,  to "de-dollarize"  intraregional  payments.  On  the other hand,  the 
analysis  in Sections  III and IV have shown that  the recent  increase  in  Latin 
American  exports  of  manufactures  have  been absorbed  mostly  by OECD  nations. 
This in spite  of the protectionist  trends of these countries.  Furthermore, 
the increase  experienced  by the aggregate  share of intraregional  imports 
during  the same  period  was basically  a consequence  of the adjustment 
process.  The adoption  of a partial  and discriminatory  liberalization  of 
regional  imports will surely  not be translated  in a significant  increase  in 
that  share  in the current  context. 
In this sense,  then,  there  does not seem to exist  any solid  basis for 
advocating  the return  to a more regulatory  approach  to commercial 
integration  in Latin  America.  As noted  before,  the resumption  of growth 
within the region  will mainly  depend  on  the design  of a satisfactory 
solution  to the debt  problem,  on the eradication  of  trade discriminatory 
practices  in industrialized  nations  and  on the extent to which  each  Latin 36 
American  country  decides to implement profound  structural  reforms  aimed  at 
avoiding  macroeconomic  instability  and at achieving  a less unbiased  and 
intricate  trade  regime.  Only if  decisive  steps  in  these directions  sre 
taken, the aggregate  volume  of imports and exports will grow,  and it would 
be reasonable  to expect  a significant  and sustained  increase in 
intraregional  trade within  the pragmatic  framework  of  the LAIA  agreement. 
VII.  Concludine  Remarks 
In this paper we have analyzed  in  detail  the evolution  of Latin 
America's  international  trade patterns.  The results of the different 
attempts  to implement  commercial  integration  arrangements  among  these  count- 
ries and the future prospects  of intraregional  trade have  been discussed. 
In  particular,  we have tried  to  assess  the role of  intraregional  trade  in 
the structural  adjustment  process  that  the solution  of  the current  crisis 
requires  from  Latin  American  nations. 
In this sense, it  was seen that most  of the schemes  designed  to promote 
commercial  integration  within  the region  were initially perceived  and 
advocated  as an extension  to the import  substitution  strategy  adopted  by 
most Latin  American  countries  in  the l950s and l96Os.  However,  we pointed 
out that  these  arrangements  overlooked  the basic inconsistency  that  exists 
between  the ambitious  goal of establishing  a common  market  of a regional 
(LAFTA) or subregional  (Andean Group)  dimension  and the need of each govern- 
ment to satisfy  the demands of their highly  protected  and influential  import 
competing  sectors.  It was as a consequence  of this conflict  that these 
schemes  turned  out to be incapable  of promoting  a significant  turnaround  in 
the volume  and direction  of  intraregional  trade.  Moreover,  it was noted 
that the relative  success of the regional  liberalization  process  carried  out 37 
in the CACM  was explained,  precisely,  by the initially weak position  of 
these  nations'  import  competing  sectors. 
It was also  established  that the dissatisfaction  with the poor  overall 
performance  of these comprehensive  integration  schemes,  together with the 
adoption  of a more  outward  oriented  strategy by most  Latin  American  count- 
ries in  the late l970s,  determined  the replacement  of LAFTA by the LAIA 
Treaty  and the practical  abandonment  of  negotiations  within  the Andean 
Group.  However,  before  the results of the more pragmatic  approach  of  the 
LAIA agreement 
- -  mainly  based  on  bilateral  tariff negotiations 
- - could be 
reflected  in  the data,  the whole  region  was shocked by the abruptcurtail- 
ment of foreign  funds  in  1982.  It  was shown that  the common  denominators  of 
the region's  adjustment  process  prompted  by this drastic  shock were an 
abrupt  contraction  in  the level of imports 
- -  sometimes  resorting  to 
outright  protectionist  measures 
-  - and  a  desperate  effort  to increase exports 
earnings  -- which  was achieved  despite the low  prices  of  these  countries' 
primary  exports. 
The extensive  analysis  of  aggregate  and disaggregate  data  carried  out 
in this  paper reflected  both the meager  results  of  the initial integration 
attempts  and the particular  characteristics  of  the region's  adjustment  to 
the debt  crisis.  With respect  to the first,  it was not possible  to detect 
any significant  change  in  the OECD  countries'  share  -- especially  the U.S. 
share -- in Latin  American imports during  the 1970s.  In  particular,  the 
region  remained  highly  dependent  on  imports of manufactured  goods 
-  -  mainly 
capital  goods  --  from  the industrialized  countries.  On the other hand,  we 
found  that the major achievement  of  the integration  arrangements  in that 
decade  was limited  to  the increase  in  the intraregional  trade  share of some 
manufactured  products.  Nevertheless,  the overall  increase  in  the volume  of 38 
intraregional  trade  flows was not found to be significant  during  that 
period. 
In turn,  the analysis  of the more  recent  evolution  of Latin  America's 
trade  flows  revealed  some interesting  patterns.  We could  determine  that  the 
increase  in  the share of intraregional  imports in  the years immediately 
following  the debt crisis  was due to an  asymmetric  contraction  in  the demand 
for imports originated  within  the region.  The temporary  nature  of this 
phenomenon  was put in evidence  by the increase  in  the proportion  of imports 
coming  from  industrialized  countries  that accompanied  the slight  expansion 
of the region's  imports in 1985 and 1986.  Another  interesting  finding was 
the significant  increase  in Latin  America's  imports of primary  products  from 
the OECD  nations  and particularly  from  the U.S.  Although  this implied a 
relative  loss of  competitiveness  in  these countries'  production  of 
manufactured  goods  in favor'of  Latin America,  the evidence  showed  that, for 
the LAIA  members,  the intraregional  share of manufactured  imports  is still 
substantially  smaller  than  that  of the industrialized  nations. 
On the other hand,  the data  on  exports revealed  that  the significant 
expansion  of Latin  American  exports  after the debt crisis  was propelled  by a 
large  increase  in the production  of fuel and of exportable  manufactures. 
Moreover,  we could  determine  that the latter were  basically  absorbed  by the 
OECD  markets,  in particular  by the U.S.  In  fact,  all those Latin  American 
countries  that achieved  a substantial  increase  in  manufactured  exports  in 
that  period  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico, Venezuela  and Chile)  experienced  a 
decline  in  the proportion  of their exports directed  to the regional  market. 
Overall,  this  evidence  seemed  to indicate that the Latin  American 
markets  possess  a rather  limited capacity  to absorb  a significant  increase 
in  regional  exports;  at least  in the current context  of restrained  imports 39 
and generalized  external  disequilibria.  It appears,  then, that the success 
of the required  expansion  in Latin  American  exports will depend  more on 
these  countries'  capacity  to diversify  their exportable  output  and to design 
innovative  mechanisms  to penetrate  the markets of industrialized  countries, 
than on a renewal  of  efforts  towards a substantial  deepening  of  any regional 
trade integration  process. 
Even if  the previous  conclusion  may seem  uncontroversial  its 
implementation  is not free  of serious obstacles.  As we have  noted,  the 
current Latin  American  trade and exchange  rate regimes are characterized  by 
a high level  of import  restrictions  (tariffs, NTB's  and  multiple  exchange 
rates) and periodic  balance  of  payments  crises propelled  by acute 
macroeconomic  disequilibria.  A sustained  increase  in Latin  America's 
exports will  be highly  unlikely  without  far-reaching  structural  reforms 
aimed  at solving  these problems.  Such an  increase  in the region's  exports 
would  also be facilitated  if a satisfactory  solution  to the debt  problem  is 
finally  reached  and if a half is being  put on the current protectionist 
trend  in industrialized  countries. 
If decisive  actions  in  the above  directions  were taken,  the existent 
schemes  for coordinating  intraregional  trade  (LAIA, CACM  and even the Andean 
Group)  would  play  a very  useful, but only  complementary,  role.  In  effect, 
by improving  the payments  clearing  mechanisms  and granting bilateral 
preferences  to the poorer  countries  these arrangements  may facilitate  the 
transition  towards  a  more affluent  and liberalized  -- in a general sense -- 
regional  trade.  However,  the temptation  to overestimate  the potential 
effects  of these discriminatory  arrangements  on the volume  of  intraregional 40 
trade must  be resisted.  A global  solution  to the current  crisis  depends 
crucially  on  the region's  ability  to avoid previous mistakes. 41 
Footnotes 
10n the early evolution  of Latin America's external  sector  see, for 
example,  Furtado  (1969).  On Latin  America  and the great depression  see Diaz 
Alejandro  (1982,  1983), Maddison  (1985) and Edwards  (l988a).  On the 
development  strategies  in  Latin  America,  see Corbo  (1986). 
21n what follows,  the English  and Spanish acronysms  of the different 
organizations  or  agreements  will  be separated by a slash. 
3See,  for example,  the discussion  in  Furtado  (1969). 
4Edwards (l988a). 
5As reflected  in the works  of  Viner  (1950), Meade (1955), Lipsey (1957) 
and Johnson  (1960). 
6These  concessions  were granted out of  the NABALALC  tariff  nomenclature 
which is based on  the Brussels  tariff  nomenclature  and contains  approximate- 
ly 9200 items.  The proportion  of these  tariff  lines included  in the 
"national  list" of each country varied  widely  across LAFTA  members. 
7See  Wionczek  (1978), dine (1983), Blejer  (1984) and Fishlow  (1984). 
8The  fifth  member  of the CACZ4,  Costa Rica, joined  the Treaty  only in 
August  of  1962.  A detailed  analysis  of the factors  that prompted  the 
creation  of CACM  can be found in  Delgado  (1978). 
9According  to  the 1965 "San Jose Protocol",  this action was supposed  to 
be taken  only  under  extremely  unfavorable  external  conditions  for the whole 
region. 
0Although all share  the characteristics  of being  primary  producers 
and extremely  dependent  on external  markets,  there  are wide differences  in 
the economic  size  of these countries.  Two groups can  be clearly  distingu- 
ished:  the relatively  more developed  countries  (Barbados, Guyana,  Jamaica, 42 
Trinidad  and Tobago)  and the less  developed  ones  (the seven Eastern 
Caribbean  islands  and Belize). 
11These  actions by Guyana  and Jamaica were implicitly  allowed  by the 
CARICOM  Treaty,  because  it did not establish  concrete  requirements  for the 
elimination  of domestic  quantitative  restrictions.  See Chernick  (1978). 
12Venezuela  joined  the group in 1973, while  Chile  withdrew  from it in 
1976 for reasons that  will  be addressed below. 
deadline  was later postponed  to 1983. 
L4See JUNAC (1982) for a detailed  analysis  of each  of these programs. 
15The  need  to  develop  an indicator of the "dual tariff-exchange  rate" 
protection  had its origins in this difficulty  (see Morales  1983). 
16An important  issue  refers to  which  external price index should  be 
used  to compute  the evolution  of  the real value of  imports and exports.  The 
figure  quoted  above was calculated  using the U.S. CPI.  If instead  the 
wholesale  price  index for the industrialized  countries  is a  whole,  as 
computed  by the IMF, is used,  Latin  American  imports declined  by 49% on real 
terms between  1980  and 1985. 
17The  decline of the trade ratio, however,  is less  marked  than  that  of 
the imports ratio.  The reason  for this is that as a result  of the adjust- 
ment program  exports in most of  these countries  increased  during  the 
period. 
181n  Argentina,  Chile,  Venezuela,  Peru,  and  El Salvador  the U.S.  share 
exhibited  a slight  increase between  1977 and 1982; in  Brazil,  Paraguay  and 
Nicaragua  there was somewhat  of a decline during  the same period.  In  the 
other  countries  the U.S. share  fluctuated  around  a fairly  stable  value 
during  1977-81. 43 
19The distinction  between  primary  and  manufactured  products  made in 
these  tables  follows a classification  criterion  similar  to that  of Tables  S 
and 9. 44 
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LAFrA:  Intraregional Exports and Preferences Granted 
1962-1980 
Intraregional Exports  Total Number Of 
+  Concessions  Granted 
Total LAFTA Extorts  On "National Lists" 
1962  4,274 
1963  7.6  7,593 
1964  8,248 
1965  8,474 
1966  9.0  9,054 
1967  9,363 
1968  10,382 
1969  10.1  10,869 
1970  11,017 
1971  11 4  11,042 









.  11,164 
1977  133 
11,173 
1978 
.  11,238 
1979 
13 8  11,249 
1980  11,252 
Source:  INTAL -- The  Latin  American  Integration  Process  (1976,  1979-80) TABLE  2 
Intraregional Exports  in the Central American Common Market 
(Selected Years) 
Intraregional  Exports 
+ 
Total  CACM Exorts 
1960  7.5 
1961  7.8 
1968  24.2 
1971  23.4 
1974  25.6 
1978  21.4 
1980  23.1 
1983  20.4 
Source:  Cline  (1983). TABLE  3 
Evolution  of Iiports and  Exports  in Selected 
Latin  American  Countries:  1970-1985 
(Millions $U.S.) 
Imoorts  _______________ 
Country  12J.Q  221  22  ).2.2._  12L..  2212  12.U  12.Q  22ffi.L  22.L. 
Argentina  1694  3946  10541  5337  3814  1773  2961  8021  7624  8396 
Bolivia  159  575  678  578  582  190  444  942  828  673 
Brazil  2849 13592  24961  21069  14346  2739  8670 20132  20175  25639 
Chile  941  1338  5123  3528  2742  1248  1552  4671  3710  3797 
Colombia  843  1495  4663  5478  4141  736  1465  3945  3095  3551 
Costa Rica  317  694  1540  889  1098  231  493  1002  870  962 
Dorn.  Rep.  304  889  1640  1444  1487  249  894  961  767  735 
Ecuador  274  987  2253  1989  1606  190  974  2481  2128  2905 
Guatemala  284  733  1598  1388  1175  298  641  1557  1153  1140 
Mexico  2461  6571  19460  15127  13994  1403  2904  15570  21214  22108 
Panama  357  892  1449  1569  1423  110  286  361  375  335 
Peru  622  2551  2500  3601  1835  1034  1291  3898  3293  2966 
Uruguay  231  557  1680  1110  788  233  384  1059  1023  855 
Venezuela  1869  6004  11827  12944  8178  2627  8800  19221  16499  12272 
Source:  International  Financial  Statistics. TABLE  4 
Openness  Index in Selected  Latin  American  Countries: 
l965l985* 
1965  1970  l9 
Argentina 
-  -  33.8  12.8  184a 
Bolivia  40.2  33.6  41.4  30.9 
Brazil  12.5  13.7  19.3  21.0  20.2b 
Chile  18.6  29.2  31.1  35.5  38.0 
Colombia  22.0  22.5  23.8  27.2  21.0 
Costa Rica  48.9  55.6  60.5  52.6  56.8 
Dom.  Republic  23.3  37.2  49.5  39.2  47.7 
Ecuador  28.6  33.1  45.5  40.3  334b 
Guatemala  31.3  30.6  37.1  40.0 
Mexico  13.0  10.9  10.81  18.9  13.3 
Panama  43.6  45.7  64.0  50.8  37.4 
Peru  33.0  26.6  31.4  41.9  316b 
Uruguay  34.8  19.3  29.3  29.0  34•8b 
Venezuela  45.2  38.3  53.7  52.4  516b 
* 
This  index  was constructed  as the ratio  of total  trade (imports  plus 
exports) to  GDP. 
a1983 
b1984 
Source:  Constructed  from data from  Directions  of Trade, International 
Monetary  Fund. TABLE  5 
Imports  By Origin  in  Selected Latin  American  Countries 
1977-1986  (percent) 
1978  jQ  1983  1984  1985  6 
Arzentina 
•Industrialized  65.8  67.5  65.0  68.2  69.1  62.8  62.9  58.1  60.4  63.1 
•Latin  America  23.3  21.0  23.6  21.4  21.1  30.0  32.6  36.5  34.6  31.5 
& Caribbean 
•Rest  10.9  11.5  11.4  10.4  9.8  7.2  4.5  5.4  5.0  5.4 
Bolivia 
•Industrialized  58.7  66.2  61.0  61.1  57.9  59.8  55.7  45.7  46.7  38.5 
•Latin  America  31.9  23.6  28.2  28.2  32.8  32.8  41.5  47.8  48.8  57.0 
Caribbean 
•Rest  9.4  10.2  10.8  10.7  9.3  7.4  2.8  6.5  4.5  4.5 
Brazil 
•Industrialized  53.4  56.1  48.9  46.6  41.8  38.6  38.3  39.7  45.1  61.3 
•Latin America  10.5  10.1  11.8  12.5  14.6  17.4  14.8  15.8  12.5  9.7 
& Caribbean 
•Rest  36.1  33.8  39.3  40.9  43.6  44.0  46.9  44.5  42.4  29.0 
Chile 
•Industrialized  53.4  57.4  54.2  60.1  60.7  57.0  50.1  52.2  51.2  56.3 
•Latin America  28.0  24.3  22.1.  27.1  25.6  23.5  29.9  28.1  26.5  24.9 
& Caribbean 
•Rest  18.6  18.3  23.7  12.8  13.7  19.5  20.0  19.7  22.3  18.8 
Colombia 
•Industrialjzed  76.2  75.7  75.4  75.3  70.]  70.4  70.7  71.6  72.8  77.5 
•Latin America  15.1  17.8  17.8  20.5  26.1  26.8  25.4  25.3  24.3  19.2 
& Caribbean 
•Rest  8.7  6.5  6.8  4.2  3.2  2.8  3.9  3.1  2.9  3.3 
Costa Rica 
•Industrialized  65.6  68.0  62.4  63.7  60.9  56.3  58.8  61.7  63.1  71.3 
•Latin America  29.3  29.3  31.8  34.2  36.8  40.5  38.7  34.8  33.0  23.5 
& Caribbean 
•Rest  5.1  2.7  5.8  2.1  2.3  3.2  2.5  3.5  3.9  5.2 
Dominican Republic 
•Industrialized  69.6  69.1  65.9  67.3  61.6  58.3  55.2  50.8  54.3  48.1 
•Latin America  28.7  28.5  31.8  30.0  36.4  39.7  42.7  46.9  42.8  43.3 
& Caribbean 
•Rest  1.7  2.4  2.3  2.7  0.2  0.2  2.1  2.3  2.9  8.6 
(continued) Table 5  (contj 
Un  n Ufl  Un  Un U Un  Un 
Ecuador 
'Industrialized  83.1  83.1  79.1  73.8  73.5  78.7  74.3  69.9  76.2  77.1 
'Latin America  11.9  11.6  13.5  18.9  13.4  15.5  19.6  24.4  16.8  17.0 
&  Caribbean 
'Rest  5.0  5.3  7.4  7.3  13.1  5.8  6.1  5.7  7.0  5.9 
Guatemala 
'Industrialized  67.4  63.3  60.3  59.4  60.6  57.6  52.4  52.1  58.6  61.3 
'Latin  America  28.5  34.1  35.3  37.3  35.8  39.5  45.3  44.9  37.9  34.9 
& Caribbean 
'Rest  4.1  2.6  4.4  3.3  3.6  2.9  2.3  3.0  3.5  3.8 
Mexico 
'Industrialized  92.8  93.1  92.0  85.8  87.6  88.1  84.1  85.9  90.0  93.0 
'Latin America  5.4  4.5  4.2  4.2  4.9  4.6  3.2  4.3  4.7  3.1 
&  Caribbean 
'Rest  1.8  2.4  3.8  10.0  7.5  7.3  12.7  9.8  5.3  3.9 
Panama 
Cndustrialized  47.1  51.1  49.2  49.6  51.1  53.6  51.3  52.0  53.5  54.5 
'Latin America  24.1  25.3  24.4  19.3  28.6  33.3  33.9  43.0  41.7  12.3 
& Caribbean 
'Rest  28.8  23.6  26.4  31.1  20.3  13.1  14.8  5.0  4.8  33.2 
Peru 
'Industrialized  67.0  74.9  63.7  62.0  66.7  77.1  78.5  71.7  69.7  69.3 
'Latin America  20.9  11.6  10.8  11.8  14.3  19.1  18.3  23.6  25.6  26.5 
& Caribbean 
'Rest  12.1  13.5  25.5  26.2  19.0  3.8  3.2  4.7  4.7  4.2 
Urusuav 
'Industrialized  38.5  36.8  34.9  35.9  35.8  34.7  29.8  31.8  34.3  39.9 
'Latin  America  29.4  29.3  38.2  37.6  45.7  41.8  44.3  37.2  38.7  43.2 
& Caribbean 
'Rest  32.1  33.9  26.9  26.5  18.5  23.5  25.9  31.0  27.0  16.9 
Venezuela 
'Industrialized  85.5  86.2  85.3  86.3  86.1  84.0  82.6  82.2  83.2  85.3 
'Latin  America  10.1  10.1  11.6  10.2  10.3  12.5  14.4  15.0  12.8  11.2 
& Caribbean 
'Rest  4.4  3.7  3.1  3.5  3.6  3.5  3.0  2.8  4.0  3.5 
Source:  Directions  of  Trade,  International  Monetary  Fund. TABLE  6 
* 
Destination  of Exports:  16 Latin American  Countries -- 1970-1984 
(percent) 
fl fl  Sn  n si sin sin sin sin 
Latin  13.4  16.5  15.8  16.1  15.6  16.4  16.2  15.9  14.3  10.5  10.6 
America 
& Caribbean 
•  AI..ADI  9.3  12.5  12.1  12.7  12.1  13.4  13.2  12.8  11.8  8.2  8.6 
OECD  75.0  63.6  66.1  66.4  67.5  66.2  63.6  58.4  62.8  69.0  71.1 
•  U.S.  30.4  28.5  28.9  29.8  32.3  31.1  29.4  26.8  29.5  37.1  40.3 
•  Japan  5.8  4.8  4.8  4.5  4.4  4.5  4.9  4.6  6.0  5.5  5.4 
CAME  2.5  5.2  4.9  4.6  3.9  3.3  4.6  6.1  4.3  4.5  3.8 
Rest  of  1.1  2.9  2.1  3.4  3.6  3.8  3.7  3.1  4.8  7.1  5.8 
REST  8.0  11.8  11.1  9.5  9.4  10.3  11.9  16.5  12.0  8.9  8.7 
TOTAL  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
* 
The countries included  here are Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Colombia, Costa 
Rica,  Chile,  Ecuador,  El Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Nicaragua, 
Paraguay,  Peru,  Uruguay and Venezuela. 
Source:  ECLA/CEPAL. TABLE  7 
Sectoral  Composition  of  Imports  In 
16 Latin  American  Countries:  1970-1984 
Total  Imoorts 
1211  12Q  12fl  1iá 
0.  Foodstuffs  and Live  Animals  8.5  8.3  10.0  11.0  9.7 
I.  Beverages  and Tobacco  0.6  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.3 
2.  Raw Nonfood,  Except  Fuel  5.7  4.5  4.2  4.8  6.1 
3.  Fuel  and Related  Products  5.7  14.0  17.8  22.9  20.5 
4.  Oil, Grease  &  Waxes  of  0.8  0.8  0.8  1.1  1.5 
Sectoral Origin 
5.  Chemicals  14.1  14.0  12.7  14.0  15.4 
6.  Manufactured  19.1  18.1  14.5  11.6  12.2 
7.  Machinery  and Transport  39.3  35.6  33.9  29.5  29.7 
8.  Other Manufactured  6.1  4.2  5.5  4.5  4.4 
9.  Other  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2 
Total (Millions U.S.$)  13,240  40,527  89,798  56,479  59,567 
Source:  ECLA/CEPAL. TABLE 8 
Upper Middle Income  Latin American Countries Imports  of 
Manufactured  and Primary  Goods - -  1970-1984 
Manufactured  Imports  Primary  Imoorts 
Total  L.A  &  Total  L.A. & 
Country  Year  U.S.$  Caribbean  gp U.S.$  Caribbean Jj 
Argentina  1970  1320.7 
1975  2822.9 
1980  8311.4 
1983  3509.0 
1984  3527.3 
Brazil  1970  2058.5 
1975  8812.4 
1980  11659.7 
1983  6020.3 
1984  5233.6 
Chile  1970  682.8 
1975  875.8 
1980  3097.6 
1983  1503.5 
1984  1960.2 
Mexico  1970  2007.1 
1975  4923.4 
1980  13898.3 
1983  7585.9 
1984  10666.0 
Venezuela  1970  1597.5 
1975  4871.4 
1980  9871.7 
1983  4454.5 






0.288  0.064 
0.164  0.170 
0.262  0.117 
0.249  0.097 











0.071  0.002 
0.185  0.004 
0.319  0.011 
0.113  0.007 






0.358  0.084 
0.310  0.140 
0.320  0.099 
0.325  0.109 











0.267  0.009 
0.381  0.019 
0.283  0.003 
0.323  0.004 






0.438  0.040 
0.344  0.085 
0.289  0.124 
0.291  0.103 











0.178  0.002 
0.383  0.005 
0.327  0.011 
0.377  0.002 






0.626  0.042 
0.625  0.062 
0.644  0.064 
0.677  0.052 











0.661  0.002 
0.657  0.001 
0.775  0.001 
0.876  0.001 






0.168  0.022 
0.136  0.044 
0.14  0.066 
0.134  0.046 











0.071  0.005 
0.181  0.006 
0.097  0.009 
0.087  0.002 






0.47  0.092 
0.483  0.090 
0.472  0.097 
0.448  0.077 











0.549  0.014 
0.515  0.012 
0.529  0.006 
0.542  0.001 
0.528  0.001 










Source:  ECLA/CEPAL. TABLE 9 
Latin American Middle Income  Countries Imports  Of 
Manufactured  and Primary  Goods -  -  1970-1984 
Manufactured  Imoorts  Primary  Imports 
Total  L.A &  Total  L.A.  & 
Country  U.S.S  Caribbean  gn  U.S.$  Caribbean  U.S. 
Colombia  1970  720.8  0.063  0.474  0.072  105.0  0.321  0.472  0.006 
1975  1249.0  0.084  0.414  0.096  224.9  0.241  0.539  0.041 
1980  3338.1  0.107  0.378  0.128  733.3  0.218  0.578  0.009 
1983  3562.9  0.111  0.299  0.153  705.5  0.218  0.568  0.008 
1984  3273.1  0.122  0.345  0.130  661.0  0.266  0.537  0.007 
Paraguay  1970  47.2  0.226  0.195  0.106  17.1  0.313  0.426  0.004 
1975  134.8  0.494  0.133  0.082  32.2  0.237  0.198  0.004 
1980  367.9  0.472  0.113  0.150  75.7  0.333  0.216  0.004 
1983  341.4  0.486  0.091  0.077  55.1  0.635  0.084  0.004 
1984  365.7  0.460  0.114  0.201  47.1  0.376  0.179  0.002 
Costa Rica  1970  263.8  0.218  0.360  0.108  40.2  0.546  0.331  0.003 
1975  534.9  0.223  0.376  0.112  80.9  0.437  0.394  0.015 
1980  1094.2  0.227  0.369  0.153  172.4  0.313  0.457  0.003 
1983  670.3  0.425  0.211  0.078  123.5  0.262  0.553  0 
1984  786.8  0.214  0.401  0.104  131.2  0.292  0.468  0 
Guatemala  1970  240.5  0.265  0.332  0.117  37.1  0.341  0.463  0.026 
1975  553.9  0.223  0.372  0.115  80.1  0.262  0.555  0.028 
1980  1020.5  0.188  0.416  0.121  160.7  0.219  0.556  0.035 
1983  828.7  0.305  0.380  0.071  129.9  0.299  0.545  0.008 
1984  827.2  0.267  0.367  0.080  135.0  0.256  0.551  0.010 
Ecuador  1970  224.1  0.079  0.444  0.097  29.5  0.113  0.565  0.124 
1975  895.1  0.122  0.363  0.167  102.1  0.059  0.688  0.041 
1980  1790.3  0.119  0.362  0.147  227.5  0.1  0.631  0.008 
1983  1267.7  0.172  0.314  0.108  204.9  0.221  0.555  0.012 
1984  1411.6  0.221  0.255  0.170  227.3  0.151  0.594  0.003 
Peru  1970  456.4  0.060  0.369  0.102  151.2  0.496  0.183  0.013 
1975  1638.6  0.103  0.314  0.109  452.7  0.101  0.479  0.010 
1980  1948.6  0.122  0.339  0.125  670.3  0.217  0.520  0.015 
1983  1545.4  0.140  0.375  0.133  613.0  0.246  0.527  0.002 
1984  1292.1  0.17  0.297  0.123  525.7  0.343  0.415  0.013 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 13 
Upper Middle Income  Countries: 
Exports  of  Manufactured  and Primary  Goods 
- -  1970-1984 
Manufactured  Exports  Primary Exoorts 
Total  L.A &  Total  L.A.  & 
Country  Year  U.S.$  Caribbean  Q....  U.S.S  Caribbean  iLL.. 
Argentina  1970  248.0  0.499  0.205  0.003  1517.2  0.160  0.070  0070 
1975  722.3  0.546  0.084  0.022  2223.0  0.170  0.060  0.050 
1980  1995.3  0.415  0.155  0.042  5737.0  0.176  0.074  0.020 
1983  1363.8  0.281  0.276  0.024  6136.1  0.094  0.050  0.054 
1984  1473.9  0.322  0.248  0.032  6299.1  0.137  0.051  0.034 
Brazil  1970  368.5  0.403  0.169  0.040  2329.0  0.062  0.261  0.055 
1975  2209.9  0.369  0.201  0.036  6068.0  0.051  0.137  0.096 
1980  7546.7  0.377  0.182  0.038  11906.0  0.047  0.174  0.079 
1983  8987.3  0.173  0.222  0.059  11465.3  0.042  0.15  0.079 
1984  11685.9  0.188  0.358  0.050  13183.2  0.050  0.212  0.071 
Chile  1970  1104.1  0.143  0.137  0.074  214.7  0.196  0.133  0.306 
1975  1180.4  0.204  0.069  0.081  454.0  0.305  0.133  0.202 
1980  2807.0  0.244  0.129  0.041  1713.0  0.237  0.057  0.226 
1983  2010.1  0.132  0.343  0.021  1548.8  0.119  0.159  0.182 
1984  1776.8  0.184  0.269  0.067  1637.7  0.127  0.203  0.165 
Mexico  1970  454.1  0.213  0.596  0.022  682.0  0.021  0.770  0.085 
1975  1062.2  0.297  0.416  0.010  1337.0  0.025  0.720  0.078 
1980  2156.9  0.231  0.541  0.026  2688.0  0.022  0.667  0.064 
1983  6194.9  0.067  0.782  0.022  2579.2  0.020  0.744  0.052 
1984  7110.6  0.058  0.805  0.017  3024.3  0.022  0.739  0.043 
Uruguay  1970  42.0  0.259  0.22  0  192.0  0.098  0.057  0.001 
1975  114.2  0.424  0.198  0.001  265.0  0.228  0.012  0.021 
1980  401.8  0.463  0.135  0.001  657.0  0.058  0.032  0.031 
1983  313.3  0.319  0.236  0.006  729.8  0.202  0.040  0.025 
1984  345.4  0.364  0.275  0.005  575.3  0.202  0.053  0.042 
Venezuela  1970  39.0  0.623  0.126  0.001  231.4  0.006  0.588  0.021 
1975  103.4  0.428  0.320  0  378.4  0.016  0.621  0.004 
1980  692.8  0.213  0.124  0.375  423.8  0.034  0.413  0.009 
1983  564.5  0.128  0.244  0.371  528.3  0.026  0.489  0.047 
1984  926.9  0.170  0.417  0.218  324.7  0.017  0.489  0.016 
Source:  ECLA/CEPAL. TABLE 14 
Middle Income  Countries 
Exports  of Manufactured  and Primary  Goods 
- -  1970-1984 
Manufactured  Exoorts  ._,  E 
Total  L.A &  Total  L.A.  & 
Country  U.S.$  Caribbean  U.S.$  Caribbean  U.S. 
Colombia  1970  62.8  0.386  0.325  0.043  591.3  0.062  0.347  0.030 
1975  308.1  0.443  0.203  0.030  1050.8  0.114  0.316  0.017 
1980  777.4  0.501  0.174  0.046  3055.2  0.060  0.293  0.036 
1983  549.0  0.365  0.281  0.063  2032.5  0.038  0.269  0.051 
1984  591.3  0.328  0.302  0.047  2344.3  0.031  0.314  0.053 
Paraguay  1970  5.7  0.365  0.359  0.004  58.4  0.387  0.111  0.006 
1975  30.8  0.465  0.039  0.057  143.2  0.335  0.101  0.009 
1980  36.5  0.733  0.100  0.011  273.7  0.416  0.087  0.012 
1983  18.1  0.510  0.181  0.006  240.1  0.389  0.073  0.008 
1984  19.0  0.253  0.508  0.003  315.5  0.386  0.026  0.025 
Costa Rica  1970  42.9  0.853  0.017  0  185.7  0.092  0.433  0.182 
1975  117.7  0.822  0.021  0  364.3  0.146  0.440  0,027 
1980  289.7  0.799  0.049  0  836.8  0.190  0.489  0.039 
1983  228.6  0.738  0.069  0  559.0  0.101  0.692  0.028 
1984  226.1  0.680  0.144  0  707.1  0.058  0.460  0.007 
Guatemala  1970  81.6  0.937  0.026  0.003  208.4  0.134  0.384  0.094 
1975  156.1  0.896  0.09  0  467.0  0.082  0.295  0.069 
1980  428.1  0.739  0.030  0.020  1029.1  0.108  0.375  0.040 
1983  279.2  0.896  0.030  0  771.8  0.139  0.447  0.054 
1984  257.0  0.862  0.059  0  811.5  0.024  0.468  0.060 
Ecuador  1970  3.3  0.79  0.132  0.007  185.6  0.049  0.521  0.060 
1975  21.5  0.761  0.183  0.011  364.5  0.070  0.548  0.012 
1980  75.3  0.875  0.081  0.006  673.7  0.072  0.468  0.022 
1983  22.2  0.793  0.132  0.005  601.2  0.046  0.444  0.008 
1984  21.1  0.665  0.157  0.007  764.1  0.071  0.713  0.022 
Peru  1970  320.9  0.059  0.514  0.077  715.7  0.062  0.253  0.164 
1975  349.7  0.191  0.278  0.128  942.5  0.147  0.232  0.113 
1980  1396.3  0.267  0.166  0.087  1286.4  0.148  0.225  0.146 
1983  735.1  0.192  0.426  0.041  809.9  0.109  0.311  0.190 
1984  789.4  0.214  0.386  0.092  1017.7  0.118  0.249  0.158 
Source:  ECLA/CEPAL. TABLE 15 
Lower Income  Latin American Countries: 
Exports  of  Manufactured  and Primary  Goods 
19  70-1984 
Manufactured  Extorts  Primary Extorts 
Total  L.A &  Total  L.A.  & 
Country  Year  U.S.$  Caribbean  U.S.$  Caribbean  U.S. 
Nicaragua  1970  28.2  0.953  0.022  0  146.1  0.253  0.347  0.152 
1975  63.0  0.916  0.066  0  306.4  0.118  0.324  0.158 
1980  59.9  0.880  0.069  0.002  393.9  0.076  0.200  0.167 
1983  34.7  0.595  0.002  0.005  393.9  0.076  0.200  0.167 
1984  32.1  0.208  0.012  0.003  354.5  0.064  0.137  0.269 
El Salvador 1970  67.2  0.960  0.016  0.001  159.9  0.052  0.215  0.157 
1975  142.8  0.909  0.017  0.001  364.3  0.035  0.375  0.165 
1980  269.2  0.918  0.026  0.001  430.6  0.076  0.480  0.079 
1983  165.9  0.851  0.057  0.001  290.2  0.069  0.420  0.099 
1984  164.0  0.844  0.077  0.001  434.3  0.102  0.465  0.077 
Honduras  1970  14.9  0.852  0.131  0  148.6  0.061  0.608  0.016 
1975  33.3  0.744  0.116  0.001  249.6  0.085  0.576  0.036 
1980  103.7  0.689  0.205  0.001  705.9  0.028  0.581  0.048 
1983  60.0  0.691  0.225  0  596.0  0.054  0.587  0.085 
1984  48.4  0.644  0.276  0  649.4  0.054  0.549  0.085 
Bolivia  1970  102.0  0.037  0.190  0  116.7  0.068  0.511  0.186 
1975  187.9  0.117  0.338  0.004  188.0  0.162  0.422  0.093 
1980  293.0  0.149  0.487  0.012  499.0  0.181  0.319  0.011 
1983  191.5  0.107  0.546  0.006  205.8  0.103  0.282  0.071 
1984  207.6  0.083  0.366  0.001  184.6  0.071  0.204  0.043 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































LTABLE  18 
Coverage  of Some NonTariff  Barriers  in Selected 
Latin  American  Countries:  1983 
Percent of Import  Percent  of Import 
Items Subject to  Items  Subject 
Outright  Prohibition  To Imiort Licenses 
Argentina 
•  All Products  23  29 
Brazil 
•  All  Products  42  n.a. 
•  Textiles  93  n.a. 
•  Agriculture  86  n.a. 
•  Wood  80  n.a. 
Chile 
•  All  Products  0  0 
Colombia 
•  All Products  n.a.  60 
Ecuador 
•  All Products  30  n.a. 
•  Agriculture  71  n.a. 
Mexico 
•  All Products  na.  82 
Source:  ALADI  (1984). TABLE  19 
Evolution  of Trade Restrictions  and Exchange  Controls 
In Two Years Preceding  17  Balance  of  Payments  Crises in Latin  America 
Payments 
Restrictions  on 
Eoisode  Current Transactions 
Tariffs,  Duties and  Restrictions  on 
Cost Related  Measures  Cacital  Transactions 
Argentina  'Increased  restric- 
(1970)  tions  on capital 
goods. 
'Public sector  pay- 
ments  monitored. 
'All foreign  ex- 
change  transactions 
suspended  for 10 
days  prior to 
devaluation. 
'Advanced deposits of 
40% for 180 days. 
•Taxes on  traditional 
exports. 
'Special regimes and 
exceptions  abolished. 
•No restrictions, 
and  no changes 
prior  to  devalua- 
tion. 
Bolivia  'Public sector  pay- 
(1972)  ments  highly 
controlled. 
•QRs on foodstuffs, 
cattle,  cotton. 
•Between May and Aug. 
a number  of  imports 
are prohibited  (1972). 
•Custom charge  of 
15% is in  place  in 
1970. 
20% tax on  exports 
imposed. 
•Restrictive  initial 
condition.  No 
changes. 
Bolivia  •Payments  restric- 
(1979)  tions  are increased 
for a number  of 
items in year  prior. 
'Exchange  transac  - 
tions suspended  for 
8 days  prior to 
devaluation. 
'In 1977 most imports 
subject  to 5-25% 
advanced  deposit. 
'Exceptions  for duty 
payments  eliminated 
for essentials  (Feb.) 
'500% advanced  deposit 
imposed on  600 items. 
'All capital move- 
ments  requires 
authorization. 
'Ceiling  set on new 
foreign borrowing. 
Bolivia  'Imports of indust- 
(1982)  rial goods produced 
locally are prohib- 
ited. 
'All sales  of foreign 
exchange  subject  to 
authorization. 
'In 1980 advanced 
deposits of 5% to 
25%. 
'1981: advanced 
deposits  reduced; 
import  duties 
reduced. 
'July 1982,  payments 
tions were tight- 
ened in  July 1982. 
Chile  'Payments highly 
(1982)  liberalized.  No re- 
strictions  imposed. 
'Flat import  tariff 
of 10% not altered 
prior  to devaluation. 
'Some restrictions 
on capital move- 
ments  are in place 
preceding  devalua- 
tion.  No changes 
prior  to abandon- 
ment  of peg. Table  19 (cant.) 
Payments 
Restrictions  on 
Eoisode.  Current  Transactions 
Tariffs,  Duties  and  Restrictions  on 
Cost Related  Measures  Caaital Transactions 
Colombia  •Initial  conditions 
(1962)  highly  restrictive. 
-Large number  of 
goods  moved  into 
prior  license  list 
during  1961. 
-All but 11 items  in 
free list  move to 
prior  license  (Aug.) 
.Many  items moved to 
prohibited  list 
(Nov. 1962). 
Colombia  -Dec.  1964:  Import 
(1965)  free list  suspended. 
95% advanced  deposit 
imposed. 
.1965: Many  goods 
passed  to prior 
licensing. 
-Dual  rates  imposed 
(Sept.) 
Colombia  •Highly  restrictive 
(1967)  payments. 
Costa  Rica -Due],  rates  (1972). 
(1974)  •Most  imports passed 
to higher  rate 
during  1973. 
-Process continues  in 
1974 prior  to 
devaluation. 
Ecuador  .1959: Multiple 
(1961)  rates;  all imports 
subject  to licenses. 
.1960:  Proceeds  from 
nontraditional 
exports  moved to 
free rate. 
-Prior  to devaluation 
tightening  of con- 
trols.  Many items 
passed to restrictive 
list. 
.1960: Advanced 
deposits  ranging 
from  1%-l30%. 
.1961: Many advanced 
deposits  reduced 
during  first half of 
year. 
•Sept. 1964:  5% 
advanced  deposit 
imposed. 
•Dec.  1964:  95% ad- 
vanced  deposit 
imposed on selected 
items. 
•Jan. 1967:  All ad- 
vanced  deposits 
increased by 50%. 
•Feb.  advanced 
deposits  further 
increased. 
•Mild restrictions  on 
trade, not increased. 
-Highly restrictive 
system, becomes 
tighter year  prior 
to  devaluation. 
-Aug. 1962: Advanced 
deposits  increased  to 
100% for list  2 
imports. 
-Dual  exchange rates 
plus active paral- 
lel market.  No 
change  prior  to 
crisis. 
•Oct. 1964:  Banco de 
la  Republics  ceases 
operations  in free 
market. 
-Slight  increase  in 
tightness. 
-Starting  from  con- 
trols,  slight 
increase  in degree 
of  restrictions. 
-Some restrictions 
in  place  (l0%-l5% 
tax on  remittances 
to rest of  world). 
-  Capital movements 
should  be 
registered. Table  19 (contJ 
Payments 
Restrictions  on  Tariffs, Duties  and  Restrictions  on 
Eoisode  Current  Transactions  Cost  Related  Measures  Capital  Transactions 
Ecuador  'Two types of import 
(1970)  lists with different 
degrees  of  restric- 
tions. 
'Jan.  -July 1970:  In- 
creased  restrictions 
including  $400  quota 
on  travelers. 
.1968: List  1 subject 
to  15% duties;  List 2 
subject  to 70% duty. 
.1969: Increased  sur- 
charges hiked. 
'Jan. 1970:  Duties 
raised to  40%  for 
List  1 and 80% for 
List  2. 
May: Further  in- 
creases in  surcharges. 
'June 1970:  In- 
creased  restric- 
tions.  Banks  and 
nonbanks  required 
to sell all foreign 
exchange  holdinga 
to Central  Bank. 
Ecuador  'Same List 1/List  2 




'Feb. 1981 increase  in 
coverage  and rates of 
advanced  deposits. 
•June: Import  tariffs 
raised  in 500 items. 
'Slight  increase  in 
restrictiveness. 
Mexico  'Initial conditions: 
(1982)  Import  licensing  and 
import  quotas. 
'1981:  Import  licens- 
ing greatly 
increased. 
•May 1981: Duties  in- 
cresed in 374 items. 
'July: Further 
increases  in duties 
levels. 
'Nov.: Duties hiked 
for 120 items. 
'No change  in 
capital  controls.  in 
period  preceding 
devaluation. 
Nicaragua  .2 groups of imports. 
(1979)  'Sales of foreign 
exchange  at official 
rate  restricted. 
'Licenses hiked in 
1978/79. 
'Multiple  rates  im- 
posed (Apr. 1979). 
'Nov. 1979: Weekly 
foreign exchange 




Peru  'Initial  conditions 
(1967)  (1965): No licenses 
required  (except 
for 12 items). 
'In 1967  a  number  of 
restrictions  were 
imposed.  Exports 
required  licenses 
(Oct.).  Exports 
proceeds  surrendered 
for certificates. 
'Aug. 1966: Most 
imports subject  to 
surcharge. 
'June 1967:  General- 
ized hike in import 
duties. 
'Very open initial 
conditions. 
'Sept.  1967: A 
moratorium  on  pay- 
ments of foreign 
debt  declared. 
Lifted  after  16 
days. 
'Slight  increase  in 
degree  of restric- 
tions. Table 19 (cont.) 
Payments 
Restrictions  on  Tariffs,  Duties  and  Restrictions  on 
Eoisode  Current  Transactions  Cost  Related Measures  Caoital  Transactions 
Peru  •Initial conditions  .Restrictive  initial  .Very restrictive 
(1975)  (1973): Severe  conditions.  During  initial  conditions. 
restrictions.  Mul-  1974  degree of  •No changes  during 
tiple exchange  restrictiveness  is  year prior  to 
rates.  Licenses  or  increased,  devaluation. 
prior  approval  •Jan. 1975:  12% 
required  for almost  surcharge  on all 
every  item,  imports. 
•No major  changes 
during  year  prior  to 
devaluation. 
Venezuela  .Multiple  rates.  •No changes in year  •Almost complete 
(1964)  •Some restrictions  prior  to  devaluation,  capital  mobility 
initially,  with  which is maintained 
licenses  required  throughout  episode. 
on some items. 
•No changes  in  year 
prior  to devalua- 
tion. 
Source:  IMF  Yearbook  on Exchanze Arranaements  and Restrictions  (several 
issues)  and Pick's Currency  Yearbook. TAZLE 20 
Developed Countries'  Tariff  and  NonTariff Earners:  1983 
U.S.A.  EEC  Japan 
Average  Proportion  Average  Proportion  Average  Proportion 
Importer  Tariff  of Imports  Tariff  of Imports  Tariff  of Imports 
Exporter  Rate  s.t.  NTB's  Rate  st. NTB's  Rate  st. NTB's 
Latin American  2.0  7.3  2.6  27.7  5.1  18.5 
LDCs 
African  LDCs  0.7  0.8  0.2  10.4  2.4  10.6 
Asian LDCs  3.3  10.2  0.9  9.9  3.7  4.8 
Other Developed  3.1  6.8  3.4  19.7  8.6  19.9 
Countries 
Source:  CEPAL (1986g). TABLE  21 
LAIA:  Pecent  Evolution  and ECLA's  Projections 
Of  Intraregional  Trade 
(percent) 
Intraregional  Exports  Intraregional  Imports 
+  + 
Total  LAIA  Extorts  Total  LAIA Imports 
1980  13.8  12.6 
1981  13.1  13.4 
1982  12.2  14.9 
1983  8.8  15.3 
1984  8.9  15.9 
Projected  Valuesa 
1985  9.0  14.8 
1986  9.7  15.6 
.1987  10.4  16.4 
1988  11.2  17.0 
1989  12.0  17.8 
1990  12.9  18.6 
1991  13.9  19.5 
1992  14.9  20.4 
1993  16.0  21.2 
1994  17.2  22.2 
aThe projections  assume that  the value  of  intraregional  trade will grow 
at an annual  rate of 16%. 
Source:  CEPAL  (1986d). 